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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
MARKET POWER AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF 
CHINA’S SOYBEAN IMPORT MARKET 
 
 Globally, China is the number one soybean importer, and the United States, Brazil, 
and Argentina are the top three soybean exporters.  This research, based on the reverse 
residual demand model, developed and estimated a two-country partial equilibrium trade 
model to test who has stronger market power in the Chinese soybean import market.  This 
two-country partial equilibrium trade model incorporates the U.S. residual soybean 
supply for China, the Chinese residual demand for U.S. soybeans, and the equilibrium 
condition, where the U.S. residual soybean supply equals the Chinese residual soybean 
demand.  Data used in this research are monthly data from January 1999 to February 
2005, 74 observations.  Empirical results indicated that Chinese soybean importers have 
stronger market power relative to U.S. soybean exporters.   
 This research also conducted the competitive analysis of the Chinese soybean 
import market by examining both annual and monthly data of Chinese soybean imports 
from the U.S. and South America (Brazil and Argentina).  Results implied that the U.S. 
and South America are seasonal complementary soybean suppliers for China.  Possible 
reasons include: 1) seasonal difference--the U.S. and South America have opposing 
growing seasons, i.e., different time periods to supply soybeans to markets; and 2) 
stronger market power of Chinese soybean importers—China’s strategic choice, 
diversifying their soybean suppliers and reducing price increase risk, made the U.S. and 
South America complementary soybean suppliers to China. 
 Additionally, this research compared the soybean export costs to China for the 
three countries.  Results showed that Brazil has the greatest advantage for production 
costs, followed by Argentina and the U.S.; the U.S. has the greatest advantage for internal 
and international transportation and marketing costs, followed by Argentina and Brazil.  
In aggregate, the total soybean export costs for Brazil were the lowest and the export 
costs for Argentina were the highest, with U.S. costs between them. 
 In terms of policy implications for the U.S. soybean industry facing strong 
competition from South America, we cannot expect that U.S. market share in the Chinese 
soybean import market can be expanded much.  With the development of infrastructure in 
Brazil and Argentina, the U.S. advantage will become less and less.  Therefore, if the U.S. 
soybean industry wants to keep its current position in the Chinese soybean import market, 
some governmental policy supports are still necessary.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 From a global perspective, soybeans are among the top five agricultural 
commodities in harvested area—wheat, rice, corn, soybeans, and barley.  As shown in 
Figure 1, in 2004 the harvested area for soybeans reached 92 million hectares, ranking 
fourth (FAO, 2005).  Among these five commodities, the international trade ratio (export 
volume divided by production) for soybeans was highest, followed by wheat, barley, corn, 
and rice.  Figure 2 shows that after 2000, about 30% of soybeans were traded on the 
world market (FAO, 2005).  This fact implies that international trade for soybeans is 
crucial for and of interest to both soybean exporting and importing countries. 
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Figure 1.  The Top Five Agricultural Commodities in the World (Harvested Area) 
Source: FAOSTAT-Agriculture, 2005.  
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Figure 2.  Global International Trade Ratios for the Top Five Agricultural 
Commodities 
Source: FAOSTAT-Agriculture, 2005.  
 From a production perspective, the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and China are the top 
four soybean producers in the world.  The sum of soybean production from these four 
countries accounted for 90% of the world total in 2004, with the U.S. at 39%, Brazil at 
25%, Argentina at 18%, and China at 8% (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  In addition, the U.S., 
Brazil, and Argentina were also the top three global soybean exporters, and the sum of 
soybean exports from these three countries accounted for 92% of the world total in 2004, 
with the U.S. at 46%, Brazil at 32%, and Argentina at 15%.   
 From an import perspective, the top four soybean importing countries are China, 
the European Union (EU), Japan, and Mexico.  The sum of soybean imports from these 
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four countries accounted for 76% of the world total, with China at 40%, the EU at 24%, 
Japan at 7%, and Mexico at 6% in 2004.  
 The U.S. leads the world in soybean production, consumption, and exports.  
However, in the last decade, soybean industries in Brazil and Argentina developed very 
quickly and became strong competitors for the U.S. in the world soybean market.  Excess 
supply of soybeans from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina increased quickly in recent years.  
To deal with this soybean surplus, Chinese soybean import market became a primary 
consideration.  Although China is a large soybean producer, China is also the number one 
soybean importer in the world.  Excess soybean demand by China skyrocketed in the last 
decade.  With 1.3 billion people, rapid economic growth, and rapid development of the 
livestock industry, the Chinese soybean demand is expected to continue to increase, as a 
main source of food oil for human consumption and feed for livestock.  In contrast, 
excess soybean demand by other main soybean importers, including the EU, Japan, and 
Mexico, have been quite stable.  Therefore, China will continue to play a key role in the 
world soybean market.  
Objectives of Research 
 Given the above facts, the Chinese soybean import market can be characterized as 
either monopsony, whereby Chinese soybean importers have stronger market power 
relative to soybean exporters, including the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, or oligopoly, 
whereby these three soybean exporters have stronger market power relative to Chinese 
soybean importers.  Knowing who has stronger market power is of interest to both 
soybean exporting countries and soybean importing countries, especially the United 
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States since soybeans are the United States’ number one bulk export commodity.  
Although the U.S. is currently the leader of the global soybean industry, the rapid 
development of Brazilian and Argentinean soybean industries is threatening this leading 
position.   
 To enhance competitiveness of the U.S. soybean industry and to expand U.S. 
market share in the Chinese soybean import market, knowing the market position and 
competitive status of these three main soybean suppliers for China is crucial for the U.S. 
soybean industry to make production and marketing decisions, and for U.S. policymakers 
to formulate soybean policies.  As the former secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Ann Veneman (2003), said 
 "One of the key objectives set forth in the Department’s new 
strategic plan is the expansion of international marketing opportunities.  
As the strategic plan and our earlier review of the U.S. food and 
agricultural system in the 21st century make clear, expanding markets is 
critical to the long-term health and prosperity of American agriculture. 
With 96 percent of the world’s population living outside the United 
States, future growth in demand for food and agricultural products will 
occur primarily in overseas markets” (Veneman, 2003).   
 The objectives of this research include 
(1) To provide a global outlook of the soybean industry; 
(2) To review soybean policies and their impacts on soybean production, 
exportation, and importation for soybean exporting and importing countries; 
(3)  To develop a two-country partial equilibrium trade model and apply this 
model to test market power for the Chinese soybean import market; 
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(4) To analyze the competitive structure of these top three soybean suppliers—the 
United States, Brazil, and Argentina—in the Chinese soybean import market. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is divided into nine chapters.  Chapter one introduces the 
background, objectives, and organization of this dissertation.  Chapter two provides an 
outlook of the global soybean industry.  In this chapter, abundant data and figures draw a 
clear picture of the world soybean industry, including the leading soybean producing and 
consuming countries along with exporting and importing countries.  Chapter three 
reviews soybean policies and their impacts on soybean production and exports from the 
U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, as well as their biotech policies and impacts on soybean 
exports into China.   
 Chapter four reviews the literature, including the Lerner Index, which is a primary 
concept to measure market power, the price to market model (PTM), which focuses on 
the impacts of the exchange rates on import prices, and the residual demand elasticity 
model, which was commonly used in the literature to empirically test market power.  
Finally, a review of research on the soybean industry includes the International Oilseed 
Model developed by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS)/Penn State Trade Model. 
 Chapters five, six, and seven develop and estimate the model, including derivation 
of the theoretical model (Chapter five), variable identification (Chapter six), and 
empirical estimation and interpretation (Chapter seven).  Based on the results from 
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Chapter seven, Chapter eight conducts additional competitive analysis of the Chinese 
soybean import market.  The last chapter, Chapter nine, is discussion and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
OUTLOOK OF THE WORLD SOYBEAN INDUSTRY 
Leading Global Soybean Producers 
 Global harvested area for soybeans increased steadily from 26 million hectares 
(63 million acres) in 1964 to 92 million hectares (226 million acres) in 2004 (Figure 3; 
FAO, 2005).  During this period (1964-2004), the average annual growth rate of the 
global harvested area for soybeans was 3%.   
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Figure 3.  Global Harvested Area for Soybeans  
Source: FAOSTAT-Agriculture, 2005.  
 Among global soybean producers, the top four countries are the U.S., Brazil, 
Argentina, and China, as shown in Figure 4.  In 2005, soybean output from these four 
countries reached 200 million metric tons, accounting for 90% of the global total (USDA-
FAS, 2006b).  Among them, the U.S. led the world in soybean production with an output 
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of 84 million metric tons in 2005.  Brazilian soybean output reached 57 million metric 
tons, about 76% of U.S. production, and ranked second in the world.  Argentina produced 
41 million metric tons of soybeans and China only produced 18 million metric tons. 
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Figure 4.  Leading Global Soybean Producing Countries 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.  
 Figure 4 also indicates that the growth of soybean production was quite stable for 
the U.S., China, and other countries.  In the last four decades, the average annual growth 
rates of soybean production in the U.S. and China were 5% and 3%, respectively.  In 
contrast, soybean production in Brazil and Argentina increased dramatically in recent 
years.  From 1964 to 2005, the average annual growth rates of soybean production in 
Brazil and Argentina were 14% and 27%, respectively (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  From these 
trends shown in figure 4, it is reasonable to expect that within a few years Brazil may 
surpass the U.S. and become the largest soybean producer in the world, if Brazil 
continues its current growth rate.  In contrast, the growth rate of Argentinean soybean 
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production is even higher than that of Brazil, and Argentina has also become a strong 
competitor for the U.S. in the world soybean market. 
Leading Global Soybean Consumers 
 Leading global soybean consuming countries (or economic groups) include the 
U.S., China, Brazil, Argentina, and the EU-25.  Figure 5 compares soybean consumption 
among these leading soybean consuming countries (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  The U.S. is the 
number one soybean consumer in the world.  In 2005, U.S. soybean consumption reached 
51 million metric tons, accounting for 61% of U.S. soybean output.  Brazil, ranking 
second in soybean consumption, consumed 31 million metric tons in 2005, accounting for 
57% of its production.  Argentina’s soybean consumption reached 31 million metric tons 
in 2005, accounting for 76% of its production.  In contrast, China’s soybean consumption 
was 45 million metric tons in 2005, while China’s soybean production was only 18 
million metric tons, resulting in a 27 million metric tons shortage.  
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Figure 5.  Leading Global Soybean Consumers 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b. 
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Soybeans compose a significant part of the human diet, especially for Asian 
countries.  Soybeans were originally cultivated in China and later spread across Asia.  
Traditional soybean products include fermented products such as Indonesian tempeh and 
Japanese miso, and nonfermented products such as tofu, sauce, curd, beverage, and 
powder.  Soybeans can be processed into soyoil and soymeal.  Soyoil is widely consumed 
around the world as food oil, especially in China, while soymeal is used for animal feed.  
Figure 6 illustrates the soybean usage distribution of the world and the leading soybean 
consuming countries in 2004.  Globally, only 6% of soybeans were used directly for food, 
and 86% of soybeans were crushed into meal for feed and oil for food or industrial usage 
in 2004 (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  Thus, China’s domestic consumption has a greater 
proportion of soybeans used as food, e.g., tofu, sauce, curd, beverage, and powder. 
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Figure 6.  Comparison of Soybean Usage Distribution 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.  
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In the U.S., over 60% of soybeans were consumed domestically.  Of this, 8% 
were waste or used as seed, and 92% were crushed into soyoil and soymeal in 2005, 
whereas 83% of soymeal was manufactured into feed and 17% of soymeal was exported.  
For soyoil, 92% of it was used for food and only 8% exported (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  
Brazil, Argentina, and the EU followed a similar pattern to the United States.  In contrast, 
China followed a different pattern for soybean consumption.  In 2005, Chinese soybean 
consumption totaled 38 million metric tons, of which 21%, or 8 million metric tons, was 
used directly for food, and 74%, or 28 million metric tons, were crushed into soyoil for 
food and soymeal for feed (USDA-FAS, 2006b).   
Leading Global Soybean Exporters 
The top three soybean exporters in the world include the U.S., Brazil, and 
Argentina.  Figure 7 shows that Brazil’s soybean exports reached 25 million metric tons 
in 2005, surpassing the U.S., and Brazil became the number one soybean exporter in the 
world.  The U.S. exported 24 million metric tons of soybeans, a 3 million metric tons fall 
compared to 2004.  Brazil’s soybean exports increased dramatically in the last decade 
from 4 million metric tons in 1995 to 25 million metric tons in 2005, an over 500% 
increase.  Soybean exports from Argentina also increased in recent years, and reached 10 
million metric tons in 2005. Brazil and Argentina became strong competitors for the U.S. 
in the world soybean market. 
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Figure 7.  Leading Global Soybean Exporters 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b. 
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Figure 8.  Export Shares of Top Soybean Exporters in the World Soybean Market 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.  
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The export shares in the world soybean market for Brazil, the U.S., and Argentina 
were 39%, 37%, and 16%, respectively (USDA-FAS, 2006b) in 2005.  The sum of 
soybean exports from these three countries accounted for 92% of the global total.  The 
trends for market shares and the structural changes in the world soybean market are 
shown in figure 8.  The U.S. soybean export share in the world market has been 
decreasing, especially in the last decade.  In 1995, the U.S. soybean export share was 
73%, but fell to 37% in 2005, a 36% market share loss in the world soybean market.  In 
contrast, Brazilian market share in the world soybean market increased from 11% in 1995 
to 39% in 2005, gaining 28% more within 10 years.  Argentina also competes with the 
U.S. in the world soybean market, and Argentinean market share increased from 6% in 
1995 to 16% in 2005.   
Leading Global Soybean Importers 
The leading global soybean importers include China, the EU-25, Japan, and 
Mexico as shown in figure 4.  China’s soybean imports skyrocketed in the last decade 
from 0.8 million metric tons in 1994 to 27 million metric tons in 2005, an almost 27-fold 
increase, while soybean imports into the EU, Japan, and Mexico remained quite stable.  
In 2005, China’s soybean imports accounted for 41% of the world total (USDA-FAS, 
2006b).  Recall that China produced 18 million metric tons and its acreage annual growth 
rate was 3%. Thus soybean imports play an important role for Chinese consumers.  The 
EU-25 imported 14 million metric tons of soybeans in 2005, which was 22% of global 
soybean imports.  Soybean imports for Japan and Mexico were 4 million metric tons each.  
Japanese and Mexican soybean import shares were each only about 6% of the world total. 
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Figure 9.  Leading Global Soybean Importers 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.  
Summary 
 In summary, the leading global soybean producers are the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, 
and China.  The leading global soybean consumers are the U.S., Brazil, China, Argentina, 
and the EU-25.  The leading global soybean exporters include the U.S., Brazil, and 
Argentina, and the leading global soybean importers are China, the EU-25, Japan, and 
Mexico, as shown in Figure 10.   
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Figure 10.  The Global Soybean Market 
 The growth of soybean production in the U.S. and China was quite steady, with an 
annual growth rate of 5% and 3%, respectively, in the last four decades.  In contrast, the 
annual growth rate of the soybean industries in Brazil and Argentina were 15% and 28%, 
respectively, during the same period.  However, soybean consumption in the U.S., Brazil, 
and Argentina did not increase as much as their production.  Therefore, soybean exports 
became an important channel for the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina to deal with their 
soybean surplus.  Soybean exports from Brazil and Argentina increased rapidly in recent 
years and became main competitors in the world soybean market.   
 On the other hand, the main global soybean importers, including the EU, Japan, 
and Mexico did not increase their soybean imports much in the past.  In contrast, for 
China, as the number soybean importer, Chinese soybean imports skyrocketed in the last 
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decade and became the primary soybean import market in the world, attracting more 
attention from top soybean exporters, including the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOYBEAN POLICY REVIEW 
Soybean Policies in the United States  
U.S. Soybean Policies 
Globally, the U.S. is the number one soybean producer, consumer, and exporter.  
Nationally, U.S. soybean production value reached $24 billion in 2004, ranking second 
among all agricultural bulk commodities behind corn (USDA-NASS, 2005).  Compared 
with two other main commodities, corn and wheat, the planted area for soybeans has 
continuously increased in the United States, whereas the planted areas for corn and wheat 
have been either relatively stable or declined (Figure 11).  From these trends shown in 
Figure 11, it is reasonable to expect that soybeans will surpass corn and become the 
number one (from a planted area perspective) agricultural bulk commodity in the United 
States, assuming that the U.S. does not make significant changes in current agricultural 
policies.  
Behind the leading position for the U.S. soybean industry both nationally and 
internationally, the support policies for soybeans from the U.S. government played a very 
important role.  The U.S. soybean subsidy program, instituted in 1941, was a commodity 
loan program, which supported soybean market prices.  Under this program, producers 
used their soybeans as collateral for government loans.  Depending on the market price 
level, farmers chose to either default on these non-recourse loans, keeping their loan and 
forfeiting soybean ownership to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or farmers 
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could sell their soybeans and repay their loans plus interest (Westcott and Price, 1999, 
2001). 
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Figure 11.  Comparison of Planted Acres for U.S. Soybeans, Corn, and Wheat 
Source: USDA-NASS, 2005. 
 The marketing loan program began in the mid-1980s and supported farmers’ 
incomes.  Under this program, farmers could operate as described above.  Alternatively, 
marketing loan provisions also allowed repayment of soybean loans at less than the 
original loan rate when soybean market prices fell (USDA-FSA, 2005a).  Instead, 
government incentives encouraged farmers to retain ownership and sell their soybeans on 
the market at a price lower than the loan rate, rather than default on their loans and forfeit 
ownership to the USDA (Westcott and Price, 1999, 2001).  
 Under these government programs, U.S. government payments to soybean 
farmers increased rapidly, especially in the past decade.  For example, net government 
expenditures totaled only $5 million in 1990 and increased to over $3 billion in 2001 as 
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shown in Figure 12 (USDA-FSA, 2005b).  Because both domestic and international 
soybean prices recovered from very low to a higher level, the net government 
expenditures for soybeans dropped significantly in 2003 and 2004. 
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Figure 12.  U.S. Net Expenditures on the Soybean Industry 
Source: USDA-FSA, 2005b. 
Recent U.S. soybean policies include both direct government and counter-cyclical 
payments (CCP), both of which began with the 2002 Farm Bill and extend through 2007.  
A description of the calculation of each follows.  The formula for direct government 
payments for soybeans is 
(1) Direct payments = Base acreage x Program yield x 85% x Direct payment rate   
In regards to variable definitions, the USDA, Farm Service Agency (USDA-FSA) defines 
base acreage from farmers’ one time choice of the following options.  This choice 
extends through 2007: 
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• “to use 2002 Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) acreage to establish CCP 
base acres;  
• to use 2002 PFC acreage and add oilseed base history for the 1998-2001 crop 
years (three options were available under this scenario that allowed flexibility 
between oilseed base acres and other crop base acres); and  
• to calculate all base acres using the farm’s planted and approved prevented 
planted history from 1998-2001” (USDA-FSA, 2003). 
The program yield for the above direct government payments is obtained by multiplying 
the 1998 through 2001 average yield for soybeans times the historic yield ratio, which is 
the ratio that results from dividing the national average yield for soybeans, 1981-1985; by 
the national average yield, 1998-2001.  The direct payment rate (DPR), set by the USDA, 
equals $0.44/bushel of soybeans in the 2002 Farm Bill.  Direct payments relate only to 
planted acreage, regardless of the crop planted.  
 In contrast, the formula for counter-cyclical payments is more complicated than 
that for direct government payments.  Counter-cyclical payments are influenced not only 
by base acreage and program yield, but also by soybean market prices (also referred to as 
marketing year average (MYA) price in the following formula).  The formula for 
counter-cyclical payments (CCP) can be expressed as follows:  
(2) Counter-cyclical payment = Base acreage×85%×Program yield×CCP rate 
(3) CCP rate = Max {0, (Target price – Effective price)} 
(4) Effective price = Max {MYA price, Loan rate} + Direct payment rate (DPR) 
The base acreage in equation (2) is defined above.  For program yield in equation (2), 
farmers can use one of the following two methods: 
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• “93.5 percent of the 1998-2001 average yield; or  
• the direct payment yield (PFC yield) plus 70 percent of the difference between 
the 1998-2001 average and the direct payment yield” (USDA-FSA, 2003). 
The counter-cyclical payment rate (CCP rate) in equation (2) is related to both the target 
price and the effective price, determined in equation (3).  The target price is set by the 
USDA.  The effective price is affected by the market year average (MYA) price, the loan 
rate (see Figure 13), and the direct payment rate in equation (4).   
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Figure 13.  U.S. Loan Rate for Soybeans 
Source: USDA-FSA, 2005a. 
 Counter-cyclical payments are closely related to soybean market prices (MYA 
prices) through these three equations (2, 3, and 4).  If soybean market prices (MYA prices) 
are higher than the national loan rate, then the effective price in equation (4) is the MYA 
price plus the direct payment rate ($0.44/bushel).  If not, the effective price equals the 
loan rate plus the direct payment rate (DPR) in equation (4).  For the target price in 
equation (3), the 2002 Farm Bill sets it at $5.80/bushel through 2007.  When the target 
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price is higher than the effective price, the difference between the target price 
($5.80/bushel) and the effective price is the CCP rate in equations (2) and (3).  Otherwise 
the CCP rate is zero, i.e., if the target price is less than the effective price.  Final counter-
cyclical payments equal 85% of the base acreage multiplied by the program yield and the 
CCP rate, determined in equation (3).  If the market price (MYA price) exceeds the loan 
rate in equation (4), so that the sum of the MYA price and the DPR, i.e., the effective price, 
is greater than the target price in equation (3), the CCP rate equals zero and counter-
cyclical payments will not occur.  
 With these supportive policies, the U.S. soybean industry has developed steadily.  
Figure 14 shows U.S. soybean production, consumption, exports, and stocks.  U.S. 
soybeans stocks have been quite stable in the past, and U.S. soybean production, 
consumption, and exports have been increased steadily. 
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Figure 14.  U.S. Soybean Production, Consumption, Exports, and Stocks 
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D, 2006b.  
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U.S. Biotech Policies 
The U.S. leads the world in agricultural biotechnology research, adoption, 
commercialization, and exports of biotech products.  The main U.S. biotech varieties 
include soybeans, cotton, and corn.  With the expectation of lower production costs, 
higher yields, and reduced herbicide use, U.S. farmers adopted biotech commodities 
immediately after they were available in 1996 (USDA-ERS, 2004).  From 1996 to 2004, 
U.S. biotech commodities expanded dramatically.  For example, in 2005, 87% of 
soybeans, 79% of cotton, and 52% of corn planted in the United States were biotech 
varieties as shown in Table 1 (USDA-ERS, 2005a). 
Table 1.  Main U.S. Biotech Varieties (Percent of Planted Acreage) 
Commodity 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Soybeans 54% 68% 75% 81% 85% 87% 
Cotton 61 69 71 73 76 79% 
Corn 25 26 34 40 45 52% 
Source: USDA-ERS, 2005a. 
In the U.S., the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are jointly responsible for 
the regulation of biotech food commodities.  Each of these three agencies has a different 
focus regarding the regulation of biotech food commodities:  the USDA is primarily 
responsible for determining whether a new product is safe to grow or not; the EPA is in 
charge of the reviews of the potential impact on the environment imposed by any biotech 
commodities; and the FDA is focused on protecting consumers and has final authority to 
declare whether a product is safe to eat or not (UF-FEI, 2005). 
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Before the commercialization of any biotech commodities, field testing is 
required as a mandated part of the approval process. In 2001, there were about 13,000 
multiple site field tests in the United States.  In 1993, the FDA announced that biotech 
foods did not require any special regulation, as they were “not inherently dangerous”.  
Since the FDA approved the first biotech commodity -- the Flavr savr tomato -- in 1994, 
the USDA has approved more than 50 biotech commodities for planting, including corn, 
tomatoes, soybeans, cotton, potatoes, rapeseed (canola), squash, beets, papaya, rice, flax, 
and chicory (UF-FEI, 2005).  
 Currently the EU, China and Japan, require that any food products containing 
biotech contents should be labeled (Marchant, Fang, and Song, 2002).  However, the U.S. 
does not require mandatory labeling for all biotech food products.  At the 1997 Codex3.1 
food labeling meeting, the U.S. delegate expressed U.S. stance on biotech products as 
"Because foods derived from plants developed through different 
methods of breeding do not differ in any uniform manner, under United 
States laws and policies, the failure to identify a plant breeding process 
is not itself considered to be an omission of a material fact of the type 
that would cause the food to be misbranded.  Thus, the United States 
believes that, as a class, foods obtained through biotechnology do not 
warrant any mandatory labeling with regard to the method by which 
they were obtained."   
"The United States believes that, if consumers wish to have 
access to information on foods obtained through biotechnology, 
manufacturers ought to provide such information on a voluntary basis" 
(OCA, 2005). 
                                                 
3.1  The Codex Alimentarius Commission is a United Nations body responsible for implementation of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health Organization Joint food Standards Program. This 
program was established to develop international food standards in the interests of enhancing consumer 
protection and ensuring fair international trade in food products. Codex Alimentarius is a Latin term 
meaning a code of law governing foods. 
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Brazilian Soybean Policies 
Brazilian Agricultural Policies 
 Brazil has the largest economy in South America and the eighth-largest economy 
in the world, with a GDP of $635 billion in real terms (2000=100) in 2004 (USDA-ERS, 
2006).  Brazil is endowed with vast agricultural resources.  Brazil’s agricultural area 
mainly includes two regions—the temperate south and tropical center-west.  In the south, 
with temperate climate, higher rainfall, better soils, greater technology and input use, 
adequate infrastructure, and more experienced farmers, make Brazilian south its main 
grain, oilseed, and export commodities production area (Flaskerud, 2003).   
 Brazilian agriculture is well diversified, and the country is largely self-sufficient 
in food.  Agriculture accounts for 8% of the country's GDP, and employs about one-
quarter of the labor force in more than 6 million agricultural businesses.  Brazil is the 
world's largest producer of sugarcane and coffee, and a net exporter of cocoa, soybeans, 
orange juice, tobacco, forest products, and other tropical fruits and nuts.  Besides crop 
production, Brazilian livestock production is also very important in many sections of the 
country.  On a value basis, production is 60% field crops and 40% livestock (Wikimedia 
Foundation, 2005).   
 Rapid urbanization and income growth caused great demand for both cooking oil 
and meat products.  To meet domestic demand for meat products, the poultry, pork, and 
dairy industries developed quickly (Williams and Thompson, 1984).  As a result, feed 
demand increased dramatically as well.  Along with the increased demand for cooking oil, 
the demand for soybeans skyrocketed.  This increased domestic demand along with 
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higher world soybean prices in the late 1990s, as well as government support policies, 
encouraged rapid expansion of soybean production in Brazil.   
 Prior to the 1990s, Brazil experienced an unstable macroeconomic environment, 
including hyperinflation, a heavy external debt burden, high interest rates, and periods of 
severe currency overvaluation.  Brazil also imposed an import tax on agricultural inputs 
and export tax on agricultural products.  These policies distorted domestic agricultural 
production (Peng, 2002; Schnepf, et al., 2001; Victor, Marchant, and Isinika, 1995).  
 In general, Brazil’s agriculture suffered much due to its unstable macroeconomic 
environment and unfavorable agricultural policies.  However, Brazil’s soybean industry 
was a special case, which has been expanding.  The reasons can be summarized as 
follows: 
 1.  The Brazilian government considered soybeans as a strategic product for the 
government from both the standpoint of technological advancement and the volume of 
financial resources perspective. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the soybean industry 
contributed greatly to Brazil’s economy, at least from the following perspectives: “(1) 
saving foreign exchange, (2) increasing foreign exchange earnings, (3) improving the 
national diet, (4) stimulating industrial development, (5) holding down food price 
increases, and (6) territorial occupation.” (Warnken, 1999). 
 2.  The Brazilian soybean industry benefited from its import-substitution strategy.  
After World War II, the Brazilian Government implemented an import-substitution 
strategy to stimulate the domestic economy and to reduce external debts.  Under the 
import-substitution strategy, the agricultural sector lost their incentive to export and put 
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more pressure on Brazil’s limited foreign exchange reserves.  To compensate for the 
shortage of foreign exchange, Brazil’s government gave the soybean industry special 
treatment to expand exports and increase foreign exchange (Schnepf, et al., 2001).  
 3. The government support policy played a key role in the Brazilian soybean 
boom.  The Brazilian government’s supportive programs included the government 
acquisition program and the National Rural Credit System (Warnken, 1999).  Under the 
government acquisition program, the Brazilian government set a minimum price level for 
soybeans and, if the market price was below the minimum price, the government would 
purchase soybeans from farmers at the minimum price. This program first began in 1975, 
and did not play an important role in the 1970s and early 1980s.  In the late 1980s this 
program did protect Brazilian soybean farmers from low domestic soybean prices.   
 Brazil’s National Rural Credit System (NRCS) included three components: 
production credit, investment credit, and marketing loan credit (Warnken, 1999).  Among 
these three components, production credit was the largest one.  The government provided 
soybean farmers credit for their production of soybeans with “negative interest rates” (the 
inflation rate was higher than the loan interest rate) for most of the years from 1970 to 
1990.  In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, about 50% of Brazilian soybean production 
used government loans and production credits averaged about one-third of the total value 
of soybean output.   
 In contrast, investment credit provided farmers and cooperatives funds for their 
investments on infrastructure improvements, such as correction of soil acidity, soil 
conservation, rural electrification, and purchase of agricultural machinery, irrigation 
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equipment, and transportation vehicles (Warnken, 1999).  Investment credit was also 
subsidized by a “negative interest rate” similar to production credit.  The marketing loan 
program primarily helped soybean cooperatives and processors for soybean storage and 
transportation, as well as processing.  The government provided loans to cooperatives or 
processors for up to six months with a “negative interest rate”. 
 Since the mid-1990s, the Brazilian government changed its agricultural policies 
and tried to eliminate its minimum price intervention and government buffer stock 
gradually (USDA-ERS, 2002).  At the same time, the Brazilian government used Federal 
taxes in addition to an array of state taxes on agricultural exports.  Currently, although 
Brazilian subsidy programs still exist, they do not play as important a role as they did 
before.  
 With all of these support programs, Brazil has been a net exporter of soybeans 
(see Figure 15), and a strong competitor for the U.S. in the international soybean market.  
In 2005, soybean production in Brazil totaled 57 million metric tons, accounting for 25% 
of the world total (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  However, Brazilian domestic demand for 
soybeans did not increase as fast as production.  Therefore, the Brazilian government 
used soybean exports to reduce its domestic soybean surplus.  In 2005, Brazilian soybean 
exports reached 22 million metric tons, an increase of 18 million metric tons, compared 
with 4 million metric tons of soybean exports in 1994, and became the second largest 
soybean exporter in the world soybean market, competing with the U.S. and Argentina.  
One interesting observation is that Brazilian soybean stock changes.  Prior to 1999, 
Brazilian soybeans stocks were very low.  However, after 1999, Brazilian soybean stocks 
increased dramatically from less than1 million metric tons in 1999 to 17 million metric 
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tons in 2005.  This huge soybean stock increase implies that Brazilian soybean storage 
capacity has been improved greatly.  In addition, this improved infrastructure may 
increase Brazil’s competitiveness in the international market.  From another perspective, 
Brazil also needs to boost their soybean exports to avoid continuous increase of their 
soybean stockpile.  
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Figure 15.  Brazilian Soybean Production, Consumption, Exports, and Stocks 
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D, 2006b.  
Brazilian Biotech Policies 
 For biotech policies in Brazil, the Brazilian Government invested heavily in 
biotech research and development in the early 2000s with estimated $15 million per year 
since 2001 (James, 2004).  However, adoption and commercialization of biotech 
commodities were not allowed before 2003.  Although the Government banned biotech 
agricultural production in Brazil, illegal growing of biotech commodities, mainly biotech 
soybeans, was quite common in Brazil before 2003.  Finally, the Brazilian Government 
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officially approved planting of biotech soybeans in 2003.  The approval was temporary, 
pending the passage of a biotech bill that will provide a permanent framework for 
evaluating and approving biotech commodities in Brazil (James, 2005).  In 2005, Brazil 
experienced the largest increase in biotech soybean adoption relative to total production 
of soybeans, with 9.4 million hectares of biotech varieties compared with 5 million in 
2004.   
Argentinean Soybean Policies  
Argentinean Agricultural Policies 
 Argentina is the second largest country in South America and the eighth largest in 
the world.  Argentina has a wealth of natural resources and a good climate, which gives 
Argentina a natural advantage in agricultural production.  From the early 1950s, 
Argentina was already a major corn and wheat producer but did not produce much 
soybeans.  Similar to Brazil, Argentinean agriculture suffered due to high inflation, an 
often overvalued exchange rate, and a heavy external debt burden.   
 Although the Argentinean Government undertook a series of programs to stabilize 
its macroeconomic conditions during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, their macroeconomic 
environment had not improved (Peng, 2002; Schnepf, et al. 2001).  In addition, the 
Argentinean Government adopted an import substitution strategy, which further 
dampened their agricultural industry.  Under this import substitution strategy, the 
Argentinean Government tried to control and reduce imports by setting high tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions (quotas), export taxes, and manipulated exchange rates.  Prior to 
1977, Argentinean import tariffs on fertilizers and agricultural chemicals were 60 and 65 
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percent.  Export taxes on grains and oilseeds were initially set at 18 percent in 1982, and 
varied each year.  As a result, Argentinean farmers had to use their inefficient, overpriced 
domestic inputs, and sold their agricultural products domestically at lower prices.  
 In 1991, Argentina enacted economic reforms moving toward a free market 
economy.  Schnepf, et al. (2001) summarized the main reform policies related to 
agriculture in Argentina as follows:  
 “The elimination of all export taxes on major grain and processed 
oilseed products in 1991, except for the 3.5-percent tax on 
unprocessed oilseed exports.  
 The elimination of all quantitative restrictions on imported 
agricultural inputs. 
 The reduction of tariffs on imported agricultural inputs to a range 
not to exceed 15 percent of CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) value, 
although an additional 10-percent tax was levied on most imported 
agricultural inputs. 
 The exemption from tariffs and taxes of agricultural inputs classified 
as capital goods—i.e., those whose economic life extends beyond one 
production cycle—such as embryos, certified seed, and trucks. 
 The elimination of several government commodity agencies that held 
export monopolies for their respective commodities (e.g., the 
National Grain Board, the National Meat Board, and similar 
agencies for sugar and tobacco). 
 The initiation of privatization in the marketing and transportation 
infrastructure, including state-owned grain elevators, port facilities, 
and railroads.” 
 These favorable policies along with high international prices for soybeans greatly 
spurred Argentinean soybean production.  In 2005, soybean output in Argentina reached 
41 million metric tons, accounting for 18% of world soybean production, ranking third 
globally behind the U.S. at 38% and Brazil at 25% (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  However, 
soybean consumption in Argentina did not grow as quickly as soybean production (Figure 
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16).  The Argentinean population is small and stable and the livestock industry is also 
relatively small.  In addition, the cattle industry in Argentina is predominantly grass-fed; 
thus soymeal demand is limited.  As a result, the international market was Argentina’s 
primary choice to deal with its soybean surplus.  Argentinean soybean exports increased 
dramatically from 2.6 million metric tons in 1994 to 10 million metric tons in 2005, 
which accounted for 16% of world soybean exports (USDA-FAS, 2006b).  
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Figure 16.  Argentinean Soybean Production, Consumption, Exports, and Stocks 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.  
Argentinean Biotech Policies 
 For Argentina’s biotech policies, Argentina conducted field trials for biotech 
soybeans as early as 1986, and began to grow biotech soybeans commercially in 1996.  
Following its introduction, biotech soybeans expanded dramatically in Argentina.  In 
2005, almost the entire national planted area for soybeans was biotech varieties, leading 
the world in biotech soybean adoption and commercialization (James, 2005).   
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 With abundant arable land and quick adoption of new technology, Argentina is a 
strong competitor in the international soybean market.  However, one disadvantage for 
the Argentinean soybean industry is that is Argentina’s pervasive policy intervention that 
ultimately promoted other sectors of the economy at the expense of agriculture.  For 
example, although its export tax was eliminated in 1991, in March 2002 a 13.5 percent 
export tax was imposed on soybeans and a 10 percent tax on most other primary 
agricultural products (Torgerson, 2002).  Then in April 2002, export taxes were raised to 
20 percent for many agricultural products, including soybeans, wheat, feed grains, and 
vegetable oils and soymeal. Soybeans were still assessed a 3.5 percent surcharge, making 
the export tax 23.5 percent for soybeans This recently re-imposed export tax dampened 
the soybean industry in Argentina and weakened their advantage in the international 
soybean market. 
Chinese Biotech Policies and Soybean Trade 
China’s Situation and Outlook 
With a population of 1.3 billion and an annual GDP growth rate of more than 8% 
in the past decade, China is not only a large producer of agricultural commodities, but 
also a large consumer of agricultural commodities including soybeans.  In 2004, China 
produced 31% of world rice, 27% of rapeseed, 19% of corn, 27% of cotton, 16% of 
wheat, and 9% of soybeans (FAO, 2005).  China is also a large player in international 
grain and oilseed markets, exporting almost four million metric tons of corn and 
importing 27 million metric tons of soybeans in 2005 (USDA-FAS, 2006b). 
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In the past, China was also a major soybean exporter in the world market.  
However, recently, demand for soybeans in China increased dramatically resulting in 
China becoming a net importer in the late 1990s from a net exporter in the 1980s.  
Figures 17 and 18 show the change of China’s status in the soybean world market 
(USDA-FAS, 2006b).  The main soybean suppliers for China include the U.S., Brazil, 
and Argentina.  Since 85% of U.S. soybeans, 22% of Brazilian soybeans, and 98% of 
Argentinean soybeans were biotech varieties in 2004, any changes in China’s biotech 
policies may have a significant impact on China’s soybean trade. 
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Figure 17.  Chinese Soybean Production, Consumption, Imports, and Exports 
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b. 
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Figure 18.  Chinese Net Imports of Soybeans  
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b. 
Chinese Biotech Policies and Trade Impacts 
Since 1986, China has invested heavily in biotech research, ranking second only 
to the United States (Huang and Wang, 2002).  By the year 2001, more than 130 species 
were obtained, including insect-resistant, bacterial-, fungus- and virus-resistant,          
salt-tolerant, drought-resistant, nutrition enrichment, quality improvement, production of 
edible oral vaccines and recombinant pharmaceuticals (Marchant and Song, 2005).  
However, only Bt cotton, delayed ripening tomatoes, cucumber mosaic virus (CMV)-
resistant sweet peppers, and color-altered petunias were approved for production within 
China.  By far, Bt cotton is the dominant biotech commodity in China, and no other food 
commodities have been approved for production (Marchant, Fang, and Song, 2002).   
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Currently, the Chinese government is struggling with the adoption and 
commercialization of biotech rice.  China’s agricultural researchers state that 
biotechnologies for rice are mature and ready for adoption and commercialization.  An 
official from the Chinese MOA said that they have already accepted the application for 
the safety evaluation (for the safety certificate) of biotech rice varieties (Cheng and Peng, 
2002). This official also mentioned that accepting the safety evaluation does not mean 
that the government will approve the adoption and commercialization of biotech rice 
varieties.  Before commercialization of biotech rice, a series of field experiments, 
production experiments and other related experiments are required.  The Chinese 
government will be very cautious in the adoption and commercialization of biotech rice, 
since currently no other countries have approved biotech rice for large-scale 
commercialization (Song and Marchant, 2005). 
Field tests, environmental releases and commercialization of biotech plants are 
regulated in China (Figure 19).  In November, 1993, the State Science and Technology 
Commission of China (SSTC) issued “Biosafety Administration Regulations on Genetic 
Engineering”, which was the first law on biosafety in China (Marchant, Fang, and Song, 
2002).  Three years later, “Biosafety Administration Implementation Regulations on 
Agricultural Genetic Engineering” was issued by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA), and took effect on the same date, July 10, 1996 (Chinese MOA, 1996).  
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“Biosafety Administration Regulations on Genetic Engineering” 
was issued by the State Science and Technology Commission and 
took effect on the same date, December 24, 1993.  
July 1996 
December 1993 
“Biosafety Administration Implementation Regulations on 
Agricultural Genetic Engineering” was issued by the Ministry of 
Agriculture of China, and took effect on the same date, July 10, 
1996.  
May 2001 
“Biosafety Administration Regulations on Agricultural 
Transgenic Products” were passed by the State Council of China 
on May 9, 2001, and issued and took effect on May 23, 2001.  
March 2002 
“Temporary Administration Procedure of Import of 
Agricultural biotech Products” was issued on March 10, 2002 
before the above effective date March 20, 2002, and was scheduled 
to terminate on December 20, 2002.
October 2002 
On October 11, 2002, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture 
announced that the above temporary import regulations would be 
extended to September 20, 2003.
On April 8, 2002, the Chinese Ministry of Health issued “the 
Sanitary Administration Rules for Transgenic Food” which took 
effect on July 1, 2002. 
April 2002 
July 2003 
On July 17, 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture announced 
that the above temporary import regulations would be further 
extended to April 20, 2004.
April 2004 
The temporary import regulations expired and the above three 
regulations took effect on April 20, 2004. 
“The Administrative Measures of Inspection and Quarantine on 
Entry-Exit Transgenic Products” was issued on May 24, 2004 by 
China's State General Administration for Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and took effect on the same 
day.  
May 2004 
(1)“Biosafety Evaluation and Administration Regulations on 
Agricultural Transgenic Products,” (2)“Labeling 
Administration Regulations on Agricultural Transgenic 
Products,” and (3)“Import Safety Administration Regulations 
on Agricultural Transgenic Products” were passed by the 
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture on July 11, 2001, with an effective 
date for implementation on March 20, 2002.  
July 2001 
Figure 19.  History of China’s Biotech Regulations 
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Prior to China’s accession into the World Trade Organization on December 11, 
2001, the Chinese government passed its “Biosafety Administration Regulations on 
Agricultural Biotech Products,” which were issued and took effect on May 23, 2001 
(Chinese MOA, 2001a).  These regulations provided general guidelines for the 
development, distribution, and use of agricultural biotech products and required a safety 
certificate and labeling for any agricultural biotech products from either domestic sources 
or imports.  The Chinese MOA issued three separate implementing regulations for the 
above guidelines on January 5, 2002:  (1) “Biosafety Evaluation and Administration 
Regulations on Agricultural Biotech Products,” (2) “Import Safety Administration 
Regulations on Agricultural Biotech Products,” and (3) “Labeling Administration 
Regulations on Agricultural Biotech Products” (Chinese MOA, 2001b).  These new 
regulations placed restrictions on Chinese imports of biotech products, including those 
imported from the United States.  The effective date for implementation was originally 
set for March 20, 2002.  
Specific rules on imports of biotech products from the above regulations included 
the following:   
(1) biotech products imported into China required test results or data obtained 
from in-country field experiments within the exporting country (or a third country) to 
prove that the products are safe for human consumption and do not impose biosafety risks 
to other plants, animals, or the environment,   
(2) each shipment of biotech products imported into China needs a single or 
separate safety certificate accompanying each shipment,  
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(3) the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture’s approval process can take up to 270 
days to grant safety certificates required for imported biotech products,  
(4) there is a "zero" threshold level (based on qualitative test results) for biotech 
content in foods,  
(5) decision-making should be based on demonstrated risks (bioharzards) from 
scientific data, whereby the expert panel should play an important role in the decision-
making process. 
Rules on labeling biotech products included the following:  
(1) all products containing biotech content should be labeled correctly, otherwise, 
the products are not allowed to enter unless they are re-labeled,  
(2) labeling rules are applied to the following imported biotech products:  soybean 
seeds, soybeans, soybean flour, soymeal, soyoil, corn seeds, corn, corn oil, corn meal, 
rapeseed seeds, rapeseeds, rapeseed oil, rapeseed meal, cotton seeds, tomato seeds, fresh 
tomatoes, and tomato ketchup (tomato jam). 
Before the effective date to implement these three regulations (March 20, 2002), 
the Chinese government delayed their implementation (Chinese MOA, 2003).  Instead, 
the Chinese MOA issued a temporary measure, “Temporary Administration Procedure of 
Import of Agricultural Biotech Products”, which allowed exporters to ship biotech 
products, including U.S. biotech soybeans, into China using temporary import certificates 
through December 20, 2002.  Each temporary import certificate granted by the Chinese 
MOA was good for 10 shipments (Chinese MOA, 2002).  After three extensions of this 
temporary measure, the above three regulations eventually took effect on April 20, 2004 
(USDA-FAS, 2004).  
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Immediately after the effective date of implementation for these three regulations, 
China's State General Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) announced a new regulation related to the administration of biotech products, 
“Administrative Measures of Inspection and Quarantine on Entry-Exit of Biotech 
Products”, on May 24, 2004 (Chinese AQSIQ, 2004; USDA-FAS, 2004).  These 
measures not only apply to the inspection and quarantine of biotech products via trade, 
but also apply to processing, research, and production.  By these new measures, Chinese 
importers must declare whether the imported products are biotech or not when they apply 
for inspection and quarantine.  If the products are biotech, the importers shall provide 
relevant documents including a safety certificate and review and approval documents 
needed for labeling.  For biotech products, labeling is mandatory by the above 
implementing regulations.  In addition, these measures also authorize the AQSIQ to 
conduct random biotech tests even if products are declared as non-biotech.  
China’s biotech regulations and policies did raise concern by U.S. agricultural 
exporters and policymakers as well as Chinese agricultural importers.  Requiring safety 
certificates incurred additional costs and shipment delays at the initiation of these new 
regulations in the late spring and summer of 2001.  In addition, these regulations have the 
potential to be used by the Chinese government as a non-tariff barrier to control soybean 
imports.  Upon examining monthly data, Song and Marchant (2005) found that China’s 
biotech policy did not impose significant impacts on U.S. soybean exports to China in the 
long-run.  This conclusion will be empirically tested in this research.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Lerner Index 
Lerner (1934) developed an index (the Lerner Index) to measure market power of 
a single firm.  The Lerner index is defined as 
(5) 
P
MCPLI −=  
where the variable P is the market price and MC is the marginal cost.  The Lerner Index 
is able to measure the degree of market power of a firm in an imperfect market, but it was 
difficult to use empirically because marginal cost data are typically unavailable.  
However, the Lerner Index does provide a provocative idea to measure market power.  
Based on the Lerner Index, subsequent literature found other ways to approximate the 
Lerner Index to measure market power in an imperfectly competitive market.  These 
measures include Pricing to Market Model and Residual Demand Elasticity Model. 
Pricing to Market Model 
 Krugman (1986) first developed the concept of “pricing to market” (PTM).  PTM 
was used to address the relationship between the changes in exchange rates and import 
prices.  Krugman defined PTM as “import prices fall ‘too little’ when a currency 
appreciates.”  Upon examining the trade data of U.S. imported manufactured products 
from Germany, Krugman summarized as “pricing to market when the exchange rate 
changes is a real phenomenon” and “PTM is not universal.”  Krugman also suggested 
both static and dynamic models to explain PTM.  His static and dynamic models included 
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supply and demand, monopolistic price discrimination, and oligopolistic models.  
Krugman concluded in his paper, “explaining pricing to market is not as simple as one 
might hope. It seems clear that a perfectly competitive model will not do the trick…” and 
“the best hope of understanding pricing to market therefore seems to come from dynamic 
models of imperfect competition.”   
 Although Krugman did not attempt to find a better explanation for PTM, his 
provocative research did bring attention to subsequent researchers.  At the end of the 
1980s, the U.S. dollar depreciated sharply, and the relationship between U.S. exports and 
fluctuations of the exchange rates attracted researchers’ interests.  Knetter (1989) 
developed a specific functional model to study PTM associated with exchange rate 
fluctuation.  Based on solving an exporters’ profit maximizing problem, Knetter (1989) 
established his model 
(6) ititiitit u sLnβλ θLn p +++=  
where the variable  is the export price to destination market i at period t, and  is the 
exchange rate (destination market’s currency per unit of exporter’s currency) of the 
destination market i at period t.  The parameter 
itp its
iβ  measures the elasticity of the export 
price changes relative to the exchange rate changes.  The parameter tθ  is the time effect, 
iλ  the country effect, and  the regression disturbance.  Knetter’s model was able to 
distinguish between three different market conditions:  a competitive market, an 
integrated market, and a noncompetitive market, depending on the estimated coefficients 
values for 
itu
iλ  and .  iβ
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 If the market is competitive, by the Lerner Index we know that price equals 
marginal cost and the Lerner Index is zero. In this case, the time effect, tθ , measures the 
common price and there is no variation in the data correlated to the country effect, iλ , or 
the exchange rate, .  In this model, the estimated coefficients for its iλ  and  should be 
zero.   
iβ
 In contrast, if one or both of the estimated coefficients of iλ  and  are not zero, 
then the market is not competitive.  Knetter applied this model to U.S. exports of onions, 
bourbon, orange juice, breakfast cereal, refrigerators, and switches, as well as German 
exports of fan belts, titanium dioxide pigment, small cars, large cars, beer, white wine, 
sparkling wine, and potassium chloride.  Knetter’s estimation results indicated that “U.S. 
export prices are rather insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations,” and “German export 
prices appear to be much more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations.”   
iβ
 Using a similar model, Knetter (1993) subsequently studied the PTM behaviors 
from both source and destination countries in the world market.  Knetter used industry 
level data from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan to compare the PTM 
behaviors from these countries.  Knetter found that the PTM behaviors were very similar 
across source countries, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.  For U.S. 
exports, the PTM behaviors were very similar across destination markets.   
 The PTM model basically deals with the relationship between export prices and 
exchange rates.  However, the PTM model does not work in China’s case, since the 
Chinese exchange rate does not fluctuate but rather is pegged to the U.S. dollar.  The 
exchange rates between Chinese currency, RMB (Yuan), and U.S. dollars were quite 
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stable for a long time.  Figure 20 shows that the exchange rate between Chinese currency, 
RMB (Yuan), and the U.S. dollar was almost constant at 8.28 (RMB/USD) from 1998 to 
2005 (USDA-ERS, 2006).  Recently, under international pressure, the Chinese 
Government promised to reform China’s exchange rate policy, and is now practicing 
limited floating exchange rates.  The current exchange rate is 8.01(RMB/USD) as of May 
2006, showing slight movement.  
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Figure 20.  Exchange Rate between Chinese Yuan (RMB) and U.S. Dollars 
Data Source:  USDA-ERS, 2006. 
Residual Demand Elasticity Model 
 Baker and Bresnahan (1988) first developed the residual demand model to 
measure market power of a single firm in an imperfect market.  Baker and Bresnahan 
argued that under perfect competition with homogeneous products, if a firm reduced its 
production, then other firms would offset the shortage due to one firm’s contraction.  
Therefore the residual demand faced by any single firm was infinitely elastic.  However, 
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with imperfect competition or differentiated products, the residual demand curve faced by 
a single firm was negatively sloped.  They defined the inverse demand function for the 
firm of interest (firm 1) as 
(7)  );Y,Q,Q(PP 11
1
1 α=
where the variables P1 and Q1 are price and quantity for firm 1’s product, Q is a vector of 
quantities for substitute products produced by the other firms, Y is a vector of exogenous 
demand shifters, and α1 are parameters.  If assuming that all products are homogenous, 
then equation (7) can be written as 
(7’)  );Y,QQ(PP 1
i
i1
1
1 α+= ∑
In regards to vector Q in equation (7), it is expressed in a similar inverse residual 
demand form 
(8)  for all );Y,Q,Q(PP i1
i
i α= .i 1≠  
The third component in Baker and Bresnahan’s model includes the supply behavior of all 
firms for .  These supply relations are written through the marginal cost (MC) 
equaling the perceived marginal revenue (PMR) 
1≠i
(9)  for all ),;,,();,,( 1
iiiii
i
i YQQPMRWWQMC θαβ = 1≠i  
where the expression  is )(⋅iPMR )]/)(/[()( ijjj
i
i
i QQQPQP ∂∂∂∂⋅+⋅ ∑ .  The vector W 
is the industry-wide factor prices and the vector  is the firm-specific factor prices.  iW
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Parameters  are associated with the marginal cost function, and the parameter  
indexes the oligopoly solution component (
iβ iθ
ij QQ ∂∂ / ) for all firms.  
 Single firm’s residual demand function was derived by solving equation (8) and 
(9) simultaneously for the vectors Q and P.  In implicit form, the solution could be 
written as  
(10)  ),,;,,,( 1
iiiii WWYQEQ θβα=
where the function  means that this was the equilibrium quantity in all markets for 
.  Finally, substituting equation (10) into equation (7) and removing redundancies, 
equation (7) becomes 
)(⋅iE
1≠i
(11)  ),,;,,,( 111
iiWWYQRP θβα=
where the function  is the inverse residual demand function for firm 1.  )(⋅R
Baker and Bresnahan took three U.S. brewing firms – Anheuser-Busch, Coors, 
and Pabst – as their samples to estimate and analyze the residual demand curves faced by 
these three companies.  They found that for the period 1962-1982, Anheuser-Busch had 
some market power, Coors had substantial market power, and Pabst had no market power.  
Baker and Bresnahan’s work provided a new approach to measure market power of a 
single firm with differentiated products within a national market.   
 Goldberg and Knetter (1999) adopted the residual demand model to measure the 
degree of competition in segmented export markets.  They started from the general case, 
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which assumed homogenous products and a group of exporters facing a particular foreign 
destination market, and defined the residual demand function as 
(12)  )Z,P,...,P,Q(DP n1exexex =
(13)  where )Z,P,P,Q(DP exjkkk = n,...,1j =  and kj ≠  
where the variable exP  is the price of the exported good, and  is the total export 
quantity.  The variables 
exQ
1P , … nP  are the prices of n competing products produced in 
other countries, and Z is a vector of demand shifters in the destination markets.  
 By solving the exporters’ profit maximizing problem, Goldberg and Knetter wrote 
the specific functional form of the first order condition as  
(14)  mt
N
mt
'
mmt
'
m
ex
mtmm
ex
mt LnWLnZLnQLnP ε+β+α+η+λ=
where the subscript m indexes a specific market, the vector Z denotes demand shifters for 
destination market m, and the vector W consists of cost shifters for the N competitors 
faced by the export group in a particular destination market.  Finally, the random 
disturbance ε  is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).  
 Goldberg and Knetter used annual data for U.S. Kraft linerboard paper (1973-
1987) and German beer (1975-1993) to estimate this model.  In the case of German beer, 
their empirical results indicated that “the elasticity of the residual demand curve German 
exporters face in each destination is closely related to the presence of the Netherlands as 
a competitor,” and for U.S. linerboard exports, “strong evidence of imperfect competition 
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in the case of Australia, which is a very small market where U.S. firms face almost no 
competition from other producers.”  
 Carter, et al. (1999) tested the world wheat market using the residual demand 
elasticity (RDE) model.  Their application of RDE model to the world wheat market 
provided a new approach to measure market power for wheat, a key international bulk 
agricultural commodity market.  Carter, et al. assumed that each country was a firm, and 
that parameters could be interpreted as share-weighted industry averages for all firms 
within one country.  Based on Goldberg and Knetter’s RDE model, Carter, et al. directly 
defined the reduced form of the inverse residual demand function for U.S. wheat as 
(15)  tt
a
t
ac
t
cu
t
uu
t LnZLnWLnWLnQLnP εγββηα +++++=
where the variable  is the price of U.S. wheat exported to Japan in yen, and  
represents the quantity of U.S. wheat exported to Japan.  The vector  is a set of cost 
shifters for a U.S. export competitor, Canada, and the vector  is a set of cost shifters 
for another U.S. export competitor, Australia.  The vector  includes demand shifters in 
Japan.  Parameters , , β , and  are to be estimated.  The error term ε  is assumed to 
be distributed independently and identically.  The subscript t stands for time period.  
Through this double-log form Carter, et al. estimated the price flexibility for U.S. wheat 
exports to Japan directly.  
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 Carter, et al. used quarterly data (1970 to 1991) to estimate their model (15).  
Their results indicated that “the United States is possibly a price leader in the Japanese 
market for imported wheat whereas Australia and Canada form a competitive fringe.” 
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 Glauben and Loy (2003) compared the PTM model and the RDE model when 
examining market power for German food and beverage export industries over 
international markets.  They found controversial results from these two models:  in some 
cases the PTM model indicated market power, while the RDE model did not.  They 
explained this conflict by fixed contracts, which were often used in the food and beverage 
export market.  
 Poosiripinyo and Reed (2005) applied the RDE model to the Japanese chicken 
meat market and estimated price flexibilities of Japanese inverse residual demand for 
whole birds, legs with bone, and other cuts from Brazil, China, Thailand, and the United 
States.  Their results indicated that only Brazil (in whole birds and leg with bone) and the 
U.S. (in other cuts) have significant market power over Japanese chicken meat importers 
as shown in Table 2 (Poosiripinyo and Reed, 2005).   
Table 2.  Summary Results of Residual (Inverse) Demand Elasticities 
Price: Residual (Inverse) Demand Elasticity (RDE) 
Products 
Brazil China Thailand United States 
Whole Birds -0.253** -0.108 0.104** -0.111 
Legs with Bone -0.103** -0.048 -0.061 0.024 
Other Cuts -0.020 -0.020 -0.081 -0.229** 
 
** significant at 1% level   
*  significant at 5% level 
 
Poosiripinyo (2004) summarized the advantage and disadvantages of the RDE 
model.  The advantages of the RDE model include 1) the RDE model can measure 
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market power with modest data requirements, which are generally lacking in domestic 
and international markets; 2) the RDE model can be defined in double-log form and the 
elasticity can be estimated directly; and 3) the RDE model can incorporate exchange rate 
variable in the model as an indicator of marginal cost change.  The disadvantages of the 
RDE model include 1) the RDE model entails a loss of price elasticity of demand; and 2) 
the estimated coefficients are difficult to interpret.  With these disadvantages of the RDE 
model, however, in cases where the Lerner Index is very difficult or infeasible to compute, 
the RDE model appears to be the next best alternative to evaluate market power. 
Review of World Soybean Market Studies 
The FAPRI/CARD International Oilseed Model 
 The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) developed an International Oilseed Model, 
a non-spatial, partial-equilibrium econometric global model.  The FAPRI’s international 
oilseed model includes major oilseed producing, exporting, and importing countries or 
regions. Their model also assumes each seed, meal, and oil as a homogeneous commodity.  
A key factor in the FAPRI’s model is that when world prices are linked to domestic prices, 
estimated or consensus price transmission elasticities are used, assuming that agents in 
each country are price-takers in the world market (FAPRI/CARD, 2005).   
 FAPRI/CARD’s price transformation model was written as 
(16)  )d(*r*PP WD ++= 1βα
Where DP  is the domestic price, and WP  is the world price of the commodity including 
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international transportation costs.  Variable r is the exchange rate, and d captures policy 
interventions between the world and domestic markets and is expressed in ad valorem 
form.  Parameter α and β are to be estimated.  
 The FAPRI/CARD international oilseed trade model incorporated four oilseeds 
including soybeans, rapeseed, sunflower seed, and peanuts.  Their model also included 
palm oil, palm kernel meal, and palm kernel oil.  The countries/regions covered in their 
model can be found in Table 3 (FAPRI/CARD, 2005). 
Table 3.  Commodity and Country Coverage of the FAPRI/CARD International 
Oilseed Model 
Soybeans Soybean Meal Soybean Oil 
Argentina Argentina Argentina 
Brazil Brazil Brazil 
Canada Canada Canada 
China China China 
EU New Member States EU New Member States EU New Member States 
European Union - 15 European Union - 15 European Union - 15 
India India India 
Japan Japan Japan 
Other Former Soviet Union Other Former Soviet Union Other Former Soviet Union 
South Korea South Korea South Korea 
Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
United States United States United States 
Rest of World Rest of World Rest of World 
Rapeseed Rapeseed Meal Rapeseed Oil 
Australia Canada Australia 
Canada China Canada 
China EU New Member States China 
EU New Member States European Union - 15 EU New Member States 
European Union - 15 India European Union - 15 
India Japan India 
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Japan Other Former Soviet Union Japan 
Other Former Soviet Union United States Other Former Soviet Union 
United States Rest of World United States 
Rest of World  Rest of World 
 
Sunflower Seed Sunflower Meal Sunflower Oil 
Argentina Argentina Argentina 
China China China 
EU New Member States EU New Member States EU New Member States 
European Union - 15 European Union - 15 European Union - 15 
Other Former Soviet Union Other Former Soviet Union Other Former Soviet Union 
United States United States United States 
Rest of World Rest of World Rest of World 
Palm Oil Palm Kernel Meal Palm Kernel Oil 
China European Union - 15 China 
European Union - 15 Indonesia European Union - 15 
India Malaysia Indonesia 
Indonesia Rest of World Malaysia 
Malaysia  Rest of World 
Rest of World   
Peanuts Peanut Meal Peanut Oil 
Argentina Argentina Argentina 
Canada China China 
China European Union - 15 European Union - 15 
European Union - 15 India India 
India United States United States 
Mexico Rest of World Rest of World 
United States   
Rest of World   
 
 From a supply perspective, the FAPRI/CARD’s international oilseeds model 
incorporates equations for area harvested, yield and production.  From the demand side, it 
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includes crush, seed, food, stocks, and other consumption.  “The crush demand is driven 
by the oil demand and/or by meal demand. Given the joint product of oil and meal and 
the positive economic value attached to meal, the derived demand from crushing reflects 
both oil and meal. The derived demand for crush oilseeds is driven by the crush margin.” 
(FAPRI/CARD, 2005).   
 Another assumption made in the FAPRI/CARD model is that trade in seeds, oil, 
and meal is an excess demand/supply and provides market closure.  For each commodity, 
world price adjusts to clear the world market and ensure that the sum of excess demands 
over all countries is zero.  The FARPRI/CARD model is also linked to other FAPRI 
model components in their livestock and commodities models. 
Economics Research Service/Penn State Trade Model 
The USDA-Economic Research Service (ERS)/Penn State Trade Model is a 
multiple-commodity, multiple-region model of agricultural policy and trade. Their model 
does not distinguish a region's imports by their source or a region's exports by their 
destination. The model is a gross trade model that accounts for exports and imports of 
each commodity in every region.  The ERS/Penn State Trade Model incorporates 12 
countries/regions and 35 commodities as shown in Table 4 (Abler, 2005).  In addition, 
the model also includes both general policy and country specific components.  General 
policy components include specific and ad valorem import and export taxes/subsidies, 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), and producer and consumer subsidies.  Country specific 
components include the U.S. loan rate; production quotas for milk for Canada; producer 
target prices, producer compensation schemes for Japan and South Korea; intervention 
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prices, variable import levies, compensatory payments, acreage set-asides, base area 
bounds, and production quotas for raw milk and sugar in the European Union.  
Table 4.  Country and Commodity Coverage of the ERS/Penn State Trade Model 
Country Coverage 
(12 countries/regions) 
United States, European Union (EU-15), Japan, 
Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, China, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and a region 
for the rest of the world (ROW). 
13 
commodities
rice, wheat, corn, other coarse grains (barley, 
sorghum, millet, and oats), soybeans, sunflower 
seed, rapeseed, peanuts, cotton, other oilseeds 
(canola, flax seed, and others), tropical oils, and 
sugar 
12 oilseed 
products 
soybean oil and meal, sunflower seed oil and meal, 
rapeseed oil and meal, cottonseed oil and meal, 
peanut oil and meal, other oilseed oil and meal 
4 livestock 
products beef and veal (combined), pork, poultry, raw milk 
Commodity 
Coverage 
6 processed 
dairy 
products 
fluid milk, butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, whole 
dry milk, and other dairy products (ice cream, 
yogurt, and whey) 
 The ERS/Penn State Trade Model adopted a reduced-form economic model in 
which the behavior of producers, consumers, and other economic agents is represented by 
elasticities and other model parameters.  The elasticities used in this model are assumed 
to be constant and draw from other trade models, including the European Simulation 
Model (ESIM), the ERS baseline projections model, and the Food and Agricultural 
Policy Simulator (FAPSIM), among others. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
Introduction 
 As presented in Chapter two, globally, China is the number one soybean importer, 
and the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina are the top three soybean exporters.  In 2004, Chinese 
soybean imports accounted for 35% of the world total, and soybean exports from the 
above three soybean exporting countries accounted for over 90% of the world total.  
Given the above aggregate market shares of these soybean traders in the world soybean 
market, the world soybean market may not be perfectly competitive.  Focusing on the 
Chinese soybean import market, it may be characterized as either a monopsony where 
China, as the leading soybean importer, has stronger market power relative to the U.S., 
Brazil, and Argentina, or as an oligopoly where the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, as the 
leading soybean suppliers, have relatively stronger market power than Chinese soybean 
importers.  This research seeks to test who has stronger market power in the Chinese 
soybean import market, analyze its competitive structure, and compare competitiveness 
of the three soybean exporters. 
 To conduct the competitive structure analysis of the Chinese soybean import 
market, it is critical to know whether the market is characterized as either a monopsony 
or an oligopoly.  Therefore, knowing the market power of different players in the Chinese 
soybean import market is a key factor in understanding the competitive structure of the 
market.  To measure market power of soybean traders in the Chinese soybean import 
market, an inverse residual soybean supply, an inverse residual soybean demand, and a 
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two-country partial equilibrium soybean trade model, combining the inverse residual 
soybean supply and the inverse residual soybean demand, were developed, estimated, and 
compared in this research.   
Modification of the Lerner Index from the Exporters’ Perspective 
 Following Carter, et al. (1999), assuming that all the soybean exporters in the 
soybean exporting country can be considered as an aggregated firm, estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as the share-weighted industry averages for all soybean 
exporters in a soybean exporting country.  In addition, soybeans exported to China from 
different countries are assumed homogeneous products.   
As shown in Figure 21, left panel, the Chinese residual soybean demand for 
country i’s (i=the U.S, Brazil, and Argentina) soybeans equals the summation of the 
Chinese domestic soybean supply, SCH; plus Chinese imports from countries other than 
country i, IMPOTH; and the net change of soybean stocks in China, STKCH; this 
cumulative supply minus the Chinese domestic soybean demand, DCH.  From the soybean 
exporting country’s perspective, it is assumed that soybean exporters in country i face a 
downward sloping residual soybean demand curve  as shown in Figure 21, right 
panel.  The curve  in the right panel of Figure 21, is the marginal cost for soybean 
exporters in country i.  To maximize soybean export profits, the soybean exporters in 
country i choose point A in Figure 21, right panel, where marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue, as the optimal choice.  Accordingly, the equilibrium export quantity is  at 
the equilibrium export price, .  The distance between A and B can be viewed as the 
mark-up for soybean exporters in country i.  
i
CHRD
iMC
XPT
iQ
XPT
iP
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Mathematically, soybean exporters in country i choose export quantity to China, 
, to maximize their profits, XPTiQ iπ ,  
(17)  XPTii
Farm
i
XPT
i
XPT
i
XPT
ii
Q
Q*)CP(Q*)Q(PMax
XPT
i
+−=π
where i = the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, and iπ  is profits obtained by soybean exporters 
in country i.  The variable  is the soybean export price by country i, which is a 
function of its export quantity, .  The variable  is the soybean farm level price 
in country i, or the exporters’ purchase cost from soybean farmers in country i, and  is 
the soybean exporters’ transaction costs in country i. 
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iP
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iP
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iP
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China’s Domestic Soybean Market Soybean Exports of Country i 
--Chinese Residual Soybean Demand for Country i
DCH
SCH + IMPOTH+∆STKCH
i
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iQ
XPT
iP
B
P P
QO
MCi
* i = the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina 
Figure 21.  China’s Residual Demand for Country i’s Soybeans 
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The first order condition (FOC) gives 
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Comparing equation (19) with the Lerner Index, equation (5), the left hand side of 
equation (19) looks similar to the Lerner Index, 
P
MCPLI −= .  Defining 
XPT
i
i
Farm
i
XPT
i
P
CPP )( +−
 as the Adjusted Lerner Index for country i (ALIi), the market 
power for soybean exporters in country i over Chinese soybean importers can be 
measured by the Adjusted Lerner Index for country i.  The right hand side of equation (19) 
is the price flexibility of China’s inverse residual demand for soybeans from country i.  
Therefore the price flexibility of China’s inverse residual demand for soybeans from 
country i can be used as an indirect measure to evaluate market power of soybean 
exporters in country i.  
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 The next step is to derive the relationship between the soybean export price in 
country i, , and the farm level soybean price in country i, .  Consider equation 
(19) above.  Assuming that the unitary transaction costs of soybean exporters in country i, 
, are a constant ratio, 
XPT
iP
Farm
iP
iC iγ , of the country i’s farm level soybean price, , i.e. 
Farm
iP
Farm
i
i
i P
C
=γ , and set XPT
i
XPT
i
XPT
i
XPT
iCH
i Q/Q
P/P
∂
∂
=θ , which is the price flexibility of the Chinese 
inverse residual demand for soybeans from country i, then equation (19) can be written as 
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Then equation (20) can be written as 
(22)  XPTii
Farm
i PP ϕ=
Equation (22) indicates a linear relationship between the farm level price and the export 
price in country i, assuming that in the short-run, the price flexibility of the Chinese 
inverse residual demand is constant. 
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Modification of the Lerner Index from the Importers’ Perspective 
 From the Chinese soybean importers’ side, facing exporting country i’s upward 
sloping residual soybean supply, Chinese soybean importers choose an optimal import 
quantity to maximize their import profits.   
 The curve CH , in the left panel of Figure 22, is exporting country i’s residual 
soybean supply for China, which equals the exporting country i’s domestic supply, ; 
minus domestic demand, ; minus exports to countries other than China, ; 
minus the change of soybean stocks in exporting country i, 
iRS
iS
iD OTHXPT
iSTK∆ .  To maximize 
Chinese import profits, facing the residual soybean supply curve, , Chinese 
soybean importers choose point C in Figure 22, left panel, where Chinese soybean 
importers’ marginal revenue, , equals their marginal import costs, .  
Accordingly, China’s equilibrium import quantity is  at the equilibrium import 
price . 
CH
iRS
CHMR CHMC
IMPi
CHQ
 ,
IMPi
CHP
 ,
 Mathematically, Chinese soybean importers choose import quantity from 
exporting country i, , to maximize their import profits, : IMPiCHQ
 , i
CHπ
(23) IMPiCHCH
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where  is the import profits obtained by Chinese soybean importers, and  is the 
Chinese domestic soybean retail price.  The variable  is the Chinese soybean 
import price from exporting country i, and  is the Chinese soybean import quantity 
i
CHπ CHP
IMPi
CHP
 ,
IMPi
CHQ
 ,
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from exporting country i.  The variable  is the exchange rate, t  is the Chinese 
import tariff rate (ad valorem) on soybean imports, and  is the transaction costs paid 
by Chinese soybean importers.  
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Figure 22.  Exporting Country i’s Residual Soybean Supply to China 
MCCH
MRCH
 i = the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina 
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 Similar to equation (19), the left hand side of equation (25) looks similar to the 
Lerner Index, 
 
P
MCPLI −= .  Define IMPi
CHPt)1( +
The right hand side of equation (25) is the price flexibility of the country i’s inverse 
residual soybean supply for China.  The market power of Chinese soybean importers ca
be measured indirectly by estimating the price flexibility of country i’s inverse residu
soybean supply function for China.  
 The next step is to derive the relationship between the Chinese soybean import 
price from exporting country i, IMPiP  ,
IMPi
CHCHCHCH PtC)/ER(P
 ,
 ,)1( +−−  as the Adjusted 
Lerner Index for Chinese soybean importers, ALICH, which can be used to measure 
monopsony power of Chinese soybean importers over soybean exporters in country i.  
n 
al 
, and the Chinese domestic soybean retail price, 
.   
 Reconsidering equation (25), the following is obtained 
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 Similarly, assuming that transaction costs for Chinese soybean importers, , 
are a constant ratio, 
CHC
CHγ , of the Chinese soybean import price, i.e. IMPi
CHP
setting 
CH
CH
C
,=γ  and 
IMPi
CH
CH
IMPi
CH
CHi
CH Q
θ  , ,∂
= , which is the price flexibility of exporting country i’s 
the above equation becomes 
 IMP,iIMP,iiRTL *ER]PP)t)([(P γθ +++= 11  
IMPiIMPi
P
Q*P
 , ,∂
inverse residual soybean supply function for China, and it can be used to measure the 
market power of Chinese soybean importers over soybean exporters in country i, then, 
CHCHCHCHCH
(26) ==>
During the period of this research (January 1999—February 2005), the Chinese import 
te to U.S. dollars were constant. Setting 
CHCH
then equation (27) can be written as 
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CH
IMP ,i
CHCHCH
i
CH
RTL
CH *P]*ERγ)θt)([(P +++= 11  
tariffs on soybeans and the Chinese exchange ra
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*5.1  Since China had a fixed exchange rate, which was pegged to the U.S. dollar, there were no changes in 
the Chinese exchange rate. 
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Equation (28 ti) shows the rela onship between the Chinese soybean import price from 
exporting country i, , and the Chinese domestic soybean retail price, 
China’s Inverse Residual Soybean Demand Model 
un  i’s 
soybeans equals the Chinese domestic demand for soybeans, ; minus Chinese 
ports from countries other than 
CH
Mathematically, the Chinese residual demand function for exporting country i’s soybeans 
(29) 
 domestic demand and supply functions are defined as 
e the variable  is the Chinese domestic soybean retail price,  is a vector of 
mand shifters, including the prices of substitutes or complements, income, 
population, among others; and  is a vector of Chinese supply shifters, including 
 or ong
e 
les i
IMPi
CHP
 ,
CHP . 
 As shown in Figure 21, the China’s residual demand for exporting co try
CHD
domestic soybean supply, ; minus Chinese soybean imCHS
country i, OTH ; plus the net change of Chinese soybean stocks, STK .  
can be written as 
where the Chinese
CHIMP
CH
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CHCHCH
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CH STK)IMPS(DRD ∆++−=  
(30) )  ;( DCHCHCHCH ZPDD =  
(31) )Z;(PSS SCHCHCHCH   =  
CHP
D
CHZwher
Chinese de
S
CHZ
prices of substitutes complements, technology, production costs, am  others.  
Chinese imports from countries other than country i and Chinese stocks of soybeans ar
considered as exogenous variab n this research.   
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 Substituting the Chinese soybean domestic demand (equation (30)) and the 
Chinese domestic supply (equation (31)) into the Chinese residual demand for exporting 
country i’s soybeans (equation (29)), and writing it in its implicit form, equation (29) 
ecome
 Chapter 2 reviewed Chinese biotech policies and their impacts on soybean trade.  
To test the impacts of Chinese biotech policies on soybean exports to China, a dummy 
ble, the Chinese biotech policy,
b s 
(32) ) , , ,  ;( CH
OTH
CH
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CH
D
CHCH
i
CH STKIMPZZPRDRD ∆=  
varia  CHBP , is added to this model, then equation (32) 
ecome
 Considering the relationship between the Chinese soybean import price from 
exporting country i and the Chinese domestic soybean retail price, equation (28) is 
ituted into equation (33) to obtain 
4) 
 Writing equation (34) in its inverse form, it becomes 
(35) 
Equation (35) is the Chinese inverse residual demand function for exporting country i’s 
soybeans. 
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Exporting Country i’s Inverse Residual Soybean Supply Model 
As shown in Figure 22, exporting country i’s residual soybean supply to China 
equals  the domestic soybean supply in exporting country i, ; minus its domestic 
soybean demand, ; minus the soybean exports to countries other than China, XPT ; 
 
iS
i i
plus the net change of soybean stocks, iSTK
D OTH
∆ .  Mathematically, exporting country 
residual soybean supply function to China can be written as 
(36) OTHiii
CH
i )XPTD(SRS ++−=  
i’s 
STK∆
Where domestic demand and supply functions in exporting country i are defined as 
(37) *5.2
(38) 
The variable  is the farm level soybean price in exporting country i,  is a vector 
mand shifters in exporting country i, including prices of substitutes or complements, 
income, population, among others; and  is a vector of supply shifters in country i, 
including the prices of substitutes or com ments, technology, production costs, among 
others.  The soybean exports from country  to countries other than China, , and 
the soybean stock changes, , are considered as exogenous variables. 
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*5.2 Assuming a constant marketing margin between the U.S. soybean retail price and the U.S. farm level 
price, the U.S. farm level price can be used in the U.S. domestic demand function instead of the U.S. 
soybean retail price for estimation purposes. 
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 Substituting domesti ean supply (equation (38)) and domestic sc soyb oybean 
and (equation (37)) into exporting country i’s residual soybean supply function for 
China (equation (36)) and writing it in its implicit form, equation (36) becomes 
DSFarmCH
and the 
i, substituting equation (22) into equation 
(39) results in 
DSXPTCH
 equation (40) in its inverse form as 
al soybean supply function to China.  
wo-Country Partial Equilibrium Trade Model 
country partial 
equilibrium trade model can be specified 
(35) 
DSCHXPTXPT STK∆  
  
e i= exporting countries: U.S., Brazil, and Argentina. 
dem
(39) ),,,;( iiiiii STKXPTZZPRSRS ∆=  
 Considering the relationship between the soybean export price for China 
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equation (41) is exporting country i’s inverse residu
The T
 Assuming other source countries for Chinese imported soybeans and destination 
countries of country i’s soybean exports are exogenous factors, a two-
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 Equation (35) is the Chinese inverse residual demand function for exporting 
country i’s soybeans, and equation (41) is exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean 
supply function for China.  Equation (42) is the equilibrium condition where, at 
ntry 
.  Data 
 
equilibrium, the Chinese residual soybean demand for country i equals exporting cou
i’s residual soybean supply for China.  Equation (43) captures the relationship between 
the Chinese soybean import price and exporting country i’s soybean export price
used in this research for the Chinese soybean import price is CIF (Cost, Insurance, and 
Freight) price, which includes the transportation costs and insurance costs.  Data for 
exporting country i’s soybean export price is FOB (Free on Board) price.  Equation (43) 
reflects the information of transportation and insurance costs. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION 
 For empirical estimation purposes, variables in equation (35) and (41) will be 
identified and the specific functional for and model, 
exporting country i’s inverse residual s
China’s Inverse Residual Soybean Demand Model 
e first group is the Chinese 
soybean import quantity from exporting country i or the Chinese residual demand for 
country i’s soybeans, .  The second group is Chinese domestic demand shifters, 
.  Theoretically
and complements, and consumers’ preferences, among others.  In this research, demand 
shifters for Chinese domestic soybeans include:  the price of corn in the Chinese domestic 
mark
livestock development index, , since soybeans can be crushed into soymeal, which 
is mainly used for feed. 
le LDI
hereby soymeal is a main feed material for Chinese livestock.  
As presented in Chapter two, in 2004, about 74% or 28 million metric tons of soybeans 
al from
m for China’s inverse residual dem
upply model, and the two-country partial 
equilibrium trade model will be developed in this chapter.  
 Equation (35) includes four groups of variables.  Th
i
CHRD
D
CHZ , demand shifters include income, population, prices of substitutes 
et, Corn , assuming that corn is a substitute for soybeans for both soybeans and corn 
can be used for feed and oil, the Chinese personal disposable income, , and the 
 In regards to the variab CH , the Chinese livestock industry has developed 
rapidly in recent years, w
CHP
CHINC
CHLDI
 
were crushed in China and soyme  crushed soybeans are mainly used for feed 
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purposes.  The development of the livestock industry in China spurred an increasing 
demand for soymeal, which led to an increase in soybean demand.  The livestock 
development index, CHLDI , was developed by calculating the chain growth rate of 
Chinese total meat output.  Meats used to calculate this index include beef, pork, poul
and fish.  In addition, the Chinese domestic soybean product prices -- soyoil price,
and soymeal price, re also included in the model. 
 The third group is Chinese soybean supply shifters.  Theoretically, supply sh rs 
try, 
, 
ifte
include production co  the prices of substitutes or complements, and technology, 
am ters of Chinese soybeans include the corn 
red 
 used 
s 
 The last group includes Chinese soybean imports from other countries, , 
.  For the variable representing Chinese biotech 
policy, as discussed in Chapter thre  China passed its first biotech product regulation in 
 OilCHP
Oil
CHP  -- we
sts,
ong others.  In this research, supply shif
price in the Chinese domestic market, CornCHP .  Similarly, as in the Chinese domestic 
soybean demand model, corn is assumed to be a substitute for soybeans.  Another 
variable included in the Chinese domestic soybean supply model is technology, measu
by the time trend variable, T .  Production costs are not included in the model.  Data
in this research is monthly data.  However, data for production costs for soybeans i
yearly data.  Production costs are not included in the model to avoid a multicollinearity 
problem with time trend variable. 
OTH
CH
and the Chinese biotech policy, 
IMP
CHBP
e,
May 2001.  Therefore, in this research, the variable  equals 0 before May 2001 and 
1 otherwise.  Since Chinese soybean stocks are very low and have not changed much 
CHBP
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during the period of this research (January 1999—February 2005), changes of the 
Chinese soybean stocks are not included in this model. 
 Based on the theoretical model and the above analysis, the specific function
form of the Chinese inverse residual demand for exporti
al 
ng country i’s soybeans is written 
s 
) 
CHCHCHCHCHCH
 εBPαIMPαT α Pα         +++++ 8765
43210
 
 the variables in equation (44), including units, where $ equals U.S. dollars, 
MT equals metric tons, and RMB equals Chinese yuan, are listed as follows. 
:  The Chinese residual demand for exporting country i’s soybeans (MT), or the 
:  Chinese corn price (RMB/MT); 
:  Chinese personal disposable income (RMB); 
:  The Chinese livestock industry development index, which is the growth rate of 
poultry, and fish; 
:  Chinese soyoil price (RMB/MT); 
:  Chinese soymeal price (RMB/MT); 
a
(44
OilCorniIMP,i PαLDIαINCαPααRDαP +++++=
CHCH
OTH
CH
Meal
CH
Definitions of
IMP,i :  The Chinese soybean import price from exporting country i ($/MT); CHP
i
CHRD
Chinese soybean import quantity from exporting country i; 
Corn
CHP
CHINC
CHLDI
Chinese meat production, including pork, beef, 
Oil
CHP
Meal
CHP
T :  Time trend variable, measuring technological progress; 
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OTH
CHP :  Chinese soybean imports from countries other than exporting country i (MT); 
  C
otherwise; 
IM
CHBP : hinese biotech policy, a dummy variable, equaling 0 before May 2001 and 1 
CHε :  Error term, assumed identically and independently distributed.  
Exp
ountry i’s soybeans, 
exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean supply function for China, equation (41), 
also includes five groups of variables.  The first group is the soybean export quantity 
from country i to China, or exporting country i’s residual soybean supply for China, 
RS .  The second group is soybean demand shifters in exporting country i, including 
person y 
orting Country i’s Inverse Residual Soybean Supply Model 
 Similar to the Chinese inverse residual demand function for c
CH
i
al disposable income within country i, iINC ; the domestic price of corn in countr
i, iP , a substitute for soybeans; the soyoil price in country i, iP ; and the soymeal 
price in country i, MealiP .  The third group is soybean supply shifters for exporting 
country i, including technology, measured by the time trend variable, 
Corn Oil
T , and the price o
i
other than China, .  The last group is country i’s soybean beginning stocks, ST
 Then, based upon the theoretical model and the above analysis, the specific 
f 
corn in country i P .  The fourth group is country i’s soybean exports to countries 
K .  
functional form of exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean supply function for 
China can be written as 
STKXPT          
TPPINCP
εββ
βββββ
+++
+++++
6
54321
  
, Corn
OTH
iXPT i
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where :  Exporting country i’s soybean export price to China ($/MT);  
:  Exporting country i’s residual soybean supply for China, or country i’s soybean 
expo
:  Personal disposable income for exporting country i ($); 
 $/MT); 
:  Soyoil price in country i ($/MT); 
:  Soymeal price in country i ($/MT); 
:  Soybean exports from country i to countries other than China (MT); 
:  Beginning soybean stocks in country i (MT); 
XPT
iP
CH
iRS
rts to China (MT); 
iINC
Corn
iP :  Corn price in country i (
Oil
iP
Meal
iP
OTH
iXPT
iSTK
iε :  Error term, assumed identically and independently distributed.  
Two-Country Partial Equilibrium Trade Model  
 Combining China’s inverse residual demand for exporting country i’s soybean 
idual soybean supply for China 
i
(equation (44)) and exporting country i’s inverse res
(equation (45)), and incorporating the equilibrium condition, where China’s residual 
demand for exporting country i’s soybeans equals exporting country i’s residual soybean 
supply to China, i.e., iCH RSRD = , the specific functional form of the two-country 
partial equilibrium trade model can be written as 
CH
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(44) 
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(42) 
P 0 φφ +=  
e i= exporting countrie  the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina. 
ither the Chinese inverse 
residual demand for exporting country i’s soybeans or exporting country i’s inverse 
residual soybean supply to China is constant, then equations (42)-(45) can be estimated 
by the double-log or semi-log form as shown by equations (46) to (49). 
(46) 
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DI
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(47) 
e i=exporting countries: the .S., Brazil, and Argentina. 
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 The equation system, equations (46) to (49), is the finalized specific functional 
form of the two-country partial equilibrium soybean trade model.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION 
Introduction 
 Since most of the data for Brazil and Argentina are not available, only the U.S.-
China partial equilibrium soybean trade model (equation system (46-49) is estimated in 
this research. 
Data Description 
 Data used in this research are monthly data from January 1999 to February 2005, 
74 observations.  The variables used in this research and their sources are listed in Table 5.  
For China’s inverse residual soybean demand model, the variables for Chinese soybean 
residual demand, , U.S. residual soybean supply, , are from the Chinese 
Minister of Agriculture (MOA, 2006).  The variable Chinese soybean import price is a 
derived price—Chinese soybean import value (Cost Insurance and Freight (CIF) value) 
divided by import quantity, and is also obtained from the Chinese Minister of Agriculture.  
The variable Chinese corn price, soyoil price and soymeal price are from Shanghai JC 
Intelligence Co., Ltd. (2005).   
US
CHRD
CH
USRS
 The variable Chinese personal disposable income comes from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Economics Research Service (USDA-ERS)—International 
Macroeconomic Data Set (USDA-ERS, 2006).  The raw data for Chinese personal 
disposable incomes are annual data.  However, in this research, monthly data is required.  
To include personal disposable income in this model, the personal disposable income was 
transformed into monthly format, as described below.  
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Table 5.  Variables and Their Sources 
Variable Meaning Source 
IMP,US
CHP  
Chinese soybean import price 
from the United States 
(RMB/MT); 
The Chinese Minister of 
Agriculture. 
US
CHRD  
Chinese residual demand for U.S. 
soybeans (MT); 
The Chinese Minister of 
Agriculture. 
Corn
CHP  
Chinese corn price at Dalian Port 
(RMB/MT); Shanghai JC Intelligence Co., Ltd. 
CHINC  
Chinese personal disposable 
income (RMB); USDA-ERS. 
CHLDI  
Chinese livestock industry 
development index; 
Chinese Statistics Yearbook 
(1999-2005). 
Oil
CHP  Chinese soyoil prices (RMB/MT); Shanghai JC Intelligence Co., Ltd. 
Meal
CHP  
Chinese soymeal prices 
(RMB/MT); Shanghai JC Intelligence Co., Ltd. 
BR
CHIMP  
Chinese soybean imports from 
Brazil (MT); 
The Chinese Minister of 
Agriculture. 
AR
CHIMP  
Chinese soybean imports from 
Argentina (MT); 
The Chinese Minister of 
Agriculture. 
EXP
USP  
U.S. soybean export price to 
China ($/MT); USDA-FAS. 
CH
USRS  
U.S. soybean residual supply for 
China (MT); 
The Chinese Minister of 
Agriculture. 
USINC  
U.S. personal disposable income 
($); USDA-ERS. 
Corn
USP  
U.S. corn retail price at Chicago 
market ($/MT); USDA-ERS. 
Oil
USP  U.S. soyoil price ($/MT); USDA-ERS. 
Meal
USP  U.S. soymeal price ($/MT); USDA-ERS. 
EU
USXPT  
U.S. soybean exports to the EU 
(MT); USDA-FAS. 
JP
USXPT  
U.S. soybean exports to Japan 
(MT); USDA-FAS. 
MX
USXPT  
U.S. soybean exports to Mexico 
(MT); USDA-FAS. 
USSTK  
U.S. soybean beginning stocks 
(MT). USDA-ERS. 
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 To transform the personal disposable income from annual form to monthly form, 
the average growth rate, consistence, and precision were taken into consideration.  First, 
the annual growth rate of Chinese personal disposable income was calculated.  Second, 
an initial value was set as the January income.  Then the calculated annual growth rate 
and the assumed initial value were used to estimate the incomes of the remaining months 
of the year.  Next step is by using trial-and-error method to adjust the January income to 
ensure that the sum of the estimated income for each month equals the actual annual 
income.  Figure 23 compares the actual annual data and the estimated monthly data for 
Chinese personal disposable income.  Figure 23 indicates that the estimated monthly data 
has a similar trend as the actual annual data, statistically, the estimated monthly income 
can be used as an approximate to the real monthly income in the empirical estimation.   
 The variable Chinese livestock development index, , is developed by 
calculating the annual growth rate of Chinese total meat output, including beef, pork, and 
poultry, and fish
CHLDI
*7.1.  The actual data of meat output is annual data from the Chinese 
Statistics Yearbook, 1999-2005 (Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, 2005).  The same 
method is used to transform the actual annual data into estimated monthly data.  The 
estimated monthly data was used as an approximate of the real monthly data.  Then the 
monthly growth rate of the estimated meat output is calculated as an index to reflect the 
demand change in feed due to rapid development of the Chinese livestock industry, 
.  CHLDI
 
                                                 
*7.1 Although fish does not belong to the livestock industry, feed for fish also contains a great amount of 
soymeal.  Therefore, when calculating the livestock development index, I also included fish meat in the 
total meat output.  
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Figure 23.  Chinese Personal Disposable Income:  Annual and Monthly 
 The variable Chinese soybean imports from other countries, , includes 
two countries--Brazil and Argentina.  So in the specific functional form of the Chinese 
inverse residual demand model, the variable  is divided into two variables:  
Chinese soybean imports from Brazil, , and Chinese soybean imports from 
Argentina, .  Data for these two variables are also from the Chinese Minister of 
OTH
CHIMP
OTH
CHIMP
BR
CHIMP
AR
CHIMP
 79
Agriculture.  After dividing the variable  into two variables:  and , 
China’s inverse residual demand for U.S. soybean model (equation 46) becomes 
OTH
CHIMP
BR
CHIMP
AR
CHIMP
(50)  
CHCH9
AR
CH8
BR
CH76
Meal
CH5
Oil
CH4
CH3CH2
Corn
CH1
US
CH
US
CH
IMPUS,
CH
ε BPα
LnIMPαLnIMPαLnTα  LnPαLnPα                  
LnLDIαLnPINCαLnPαLnRDLnP
++
+++++
++++= θα 0
 For the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply to China model, the variables U.S. 
soybean export price to China is a derived price (FOB price) obtained by dividing the 
total monthly value of U.S. soybean exports by the total monthly volume of U.S. soybean 
exports.  Data for U.S. soybean export value and volume were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service (USDA-FAS, 2006)—U.S. Trade 
Internet System.  The variable U.S. personal disposable income comes from USDA-ERS, 
International Macroeconomic Data Set (2006).  Similar to Chinese personal disposable 
income, the raw data of U.S. personal disposable income is annual data.  Using the same 
method as used for Chinese personal disposable income, U.S. monthly personal 
disposable income is estimated from the actual annual income.  Figure 24 compares the 
actual annual data and the estimated monthly data for U.S. personal disposable income, 
and it shows that the estimated monthly data has the similar trend as the actual annual 
data.  
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Figure 24.  U.S. Personal Disposable Income:  Annual and Monthly 
 The variable the U.S. corn price comes from USDA-ERS, Feed Outlook Report 
from 1995 to 2005 (USDA-ERS, 2005b).  The variables U.S. soyoil price, U.S. soymeal 
price, and U.S. soybean stocks come from USDA-ERS, Oil Crops Yearbook from 2002-
2005 (USDA-ERS, 2005c).  The variable U.S. soybean exports to countries other than 
China, , is divided into three variables:  U.S. soybean exports to the EU, , OTH EUUSEXP USEXP
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U.S. soybean exports to Japan, , and U.S. soybean exports to Mexico, .  
Data for these three variables come from USDA-FAS—U.S. Trade Internet System 
(USDA-FAS, 2006).  After dividing the variable  into three variables: , 
, and , U.S. inverse residual soybean supply for China model (equation 47) 
becomes  
JP MX
OTH EU
JP MX
USEXP USEXP
USEXP USEXP
USEXP USEXP
(51)  
USUS9
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 Then the U.S.-China partial equilibrium soybean trade model (equations 46-49)  
becomes 
(50)  
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(52)  CHUS
US
CH LnRSLnRD =
(53)  XPTUS
IMP,US
CH LnPLnP 10 φφ +=
Specification Test 
 Before estimating the U.S.-China partial equilibrium soybean trade model, 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and multicollinearity tests are conducted for both 
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China’s inverse residual demand function for U.S. soybeans (equation 50) and U.S. 
inverse residual soybean supply function for China (equation 51).  
Heteroskedasticity Test 
 White’s test (White 1980) is used to test the heteroskedasticity problems for both 
China’s inverse residual demand function for U.S. soybeans (equation 50) and U.S. 
inverse residual soybean supply function for China (equation 51).  The residuals of 
estimation are used to investigate the heteroskedasticity of the true disturbances.  The null 
hypothesis for White’s test is 
 H0:   for all i.  22 σσ =i
 SAS “proc model” procedure gives the test results when the option “White” is 
given (SAS, v.8.02).  Test results, shown in Table 6, indicate that the null hypothesis for 
equation (50) and (51) cannot be rejected for both models.  These test results imply that 
both China’s inverse residual demand function and U.S. inverse residual soybean supply 
function do not encounter the heteroskedasticity problem. 
Table 6.  White’s Test Results for Heteroskedasticity 
Function 
White's 
Test 
Statistic 
Critical 
Value Pr>ChiSq Result 
The China’s inverse residual 
demand function for U.S. 
soybeans (equation 50) 
63.13 67.5 0.2687 Fail to reject H0. 
The U.S. inverse residual 
soybean supply function for 
China (equation 51) 
62.81 67.5 0.3097 Fail to reject H0. 
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Autocorrelation Test 
 Autocorrelation problem was tested by testing the correlation of the current 
residual and the lagged residual obtained from the ordinary least square estimation (OLS).  
First, initial residuals were obtained by OLS estimation (by SAS).  Next step is running 
regression of the current residual  on the lagged residual  to test whether the 
parameter of  is significant or not.  Mathematically, 
te 1−te
1−te
(54)  uecce tt ++= −110
where  is the residual from the OLS estimation, and  is the lagged residual.  te 1−te
 Hypothesis to be tested is 
 H0:  =0, Ha:  c1c 1≠ 0.  
 Test results for both China’s inverse residual demand function (equation 50) and 
U.S. inverse residual supply function (equation 51), shown in Table 7, imply that the null 
hypothesis for China’s inverse residual demand function, cannot be rejected.  However, 
the null hypothesis for U.S. inverse residual supply function is rejected.  These test 
results indicate that China’s inverse residual demand function does not appear to 
encounter the autocorrelation problem, while the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply 
function does have autocorrelation.  To improve empirical estimation results, the 
autocorrelation problem for the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply function need to be 
corrected.  
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Table 7.  Test Results for Autocorrelation 
Function Coefficient Standard Error T-value Pr>ChiSq Result 
The Chinese inverse 
residual demand function 
for U.S. soybeans 
(equation 50) 
-0.0041 0.1274 -0.03 0.9743 Fail to reject H0. 
The U.S. inverse residual 
soybean supply function 
for China (equation 51) 
0.357 0.1208 2.96 0.0044 Reject H0. 
 
Multicollinearity Test 
 Two methods are used to test for multicollinearity.  The first one looks at the 
correlations among independent variables.  If the correlation between two variables is 
very high, then the multicollinearity problem may be present.  
 Test results for China’s inverse residual demand function for U.S. soybeans, 
reported in Table 8, show that the correlation between the time trend variable, T , and 
Chinese personal disposable income, , is 0.99 and the correlation between the time 
trend variable, 
CHINC
T , and the Chinese livestock development index, , is 0.98.  That 
means the time trend variable, 
CHLDI
T , is possibly a problematic variable, which causes 
multicollinearity problem.  
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Table 8.  Correlation between Independent Variables for the Chinese Inverse 
Residual Demand for U.S. Soybeans 
Correlation US
CHRD  
Corn
CHP  CHINC  CHLDI
Oil
CHP  
Meal
CHP  T  
BR
CHIMP  
AR
CHIMP CHBP
US
CHRD  1          
Corn
CHP  -0.11 1         
CHINC  -0.06 0.62 1        
CHLDI  -0.05 0.66 0.85 1       
Oil
CHP  0.03 0.22 0.15 0.20 1      
Meal
CHP  -0.03 0.58 0.78 0.82 0.38 1     
T  -0.05 0.63 0.99 0.98 0.04 0.78 1    
BR
CHIMP  -0.25 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.01 0.35 0.38 1   
AR
CHIMP  -0.32 0.11 0.30 0.29 -0.02 0.36 0.32 0.70 1  
CHBP  -0.14 0.58 0.87 0.83 -0.07 0.48 0.86 0.33 0.24 1
 
 Test results for U.S. inverse residual soybean supply for China, reported in Table 
9, show that the correlation between the time trend variable, T , and the U.S. personal 
disposable income, , is 0.96, which means that there is a possible collinearity 
problem between these two variables.   
USINC
 From this method, results indicate that for both China’s inverse residual demand 
function and U.S. inverse residual soybean supply, the time trend variable, T, might cause 
the multicollinearity problem.   
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Table 9.  Correlation between Independent Variables for the U.S. Inverse Residual 
Soybean Supply for China 
Correlation 
CH
USRS  USINC  
Corn
USP
Oil
USP  
Meal
USP T  
EU
USXPT
JP
USXPT  
MX
USXPT USSTK
CH
USRS  1          
USINC  -0.03 1         
Corn
USP  0.03 0.49 1        
Oil
USP  -0.02 0.50 0.84 1       
Meal
USP  0.01 0.62 0.70 0.67 1      
T  -0.05 0.96 0.63 0.63 0.64 1     
EU
USXPT  0.50 -0.23 -0.08 -0.14 -0.15 -0.20 1    
JP
USXPT  0.42 -0.12 -0.22 -0.20 -0.31 -0.15 0.59 1   
MX
USXPT  0.20 -0.16 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.13 0.42 0.32 1  
USSTK  0.49 -0.08 0.07 -0.11 0.07 -0.10 0.35 0.28 -0.01 1
 
 The second method is the Condition Indices developed by Belsey, Kuh, and 
Welsch (1980).  When the calculated condition index is around 10, weak dependencies 
may be starting to affect the regression estimates.  When this number is larger than 100, 
the estimates may have a fair amount of numerical error (SAS, v8.02).  In SAS, option 
COLLIN automatically tests multicollinearity problem and gives suggested variables 
which may cause multicollinearity problem.  SAS estimation results for both China’s 
inverse residual demand function and U.S. inverse residual soybean supply function, 
indicate that the time trend variable, T , was the only variable that caused the 
multicollinearity problem.  To avoid multicollinearity problem, in the final estimation, 
the time trend variable, T , was dropped.  
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Empirical Estimation and Interpretation 
 In this section, the two-country partial equilibrium trade model (equation 50-53) 
is estimated simultaneously by SAS full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
method.  Estimation results, reported in Table 10, show that for China’s inverse residual 
demand function (equation 50), four variables, including the Chinese residual demand, 
, the Chinese domestic corn price, , and the prices of soyoil and soymeal in 
China,  and , are statistically significant at a 1% significant level.   
US
CHRD
Corn
CHP
Oil
CHP
Meal
CHP
 The sign of the estimated coefficient for the Chinese residual demand, , is 
negative as expected, indicating a downward sloping residual demand for U.S. soybeans.  
By equation (55), the estimated coefficient is also the price flexibility of the Chinese 
residual demand function for U.S. soybeans, equaling the Adjusted Lerner Index, ALI
US
CHRD
US, 
which can be used to measure the market power of U.S. soybean exporters as shown by 
equation (19).  From another perspective, the estimated coefficient also indicates the 
market margin of U.S. soybean exporters (the difference between the U.S. soybean export 
price and the sum of the U.S. farm level soybean prices and the transaction costs of U.S. 
soybean exporters).  Results from Table 10 imply that the U.S. soybean exporters’ 
marketing margin is 4% of the U.S. farm level soybean price.  
 For the estimated coefficient of the Chinese domestic corn price, results imply 
that keeping other variables constant, a 1% corn price increase will cause a 27% increase 
in the Chinese soybean import price from the United States.  For the Chinese domestic 
prices of soyoil and soymeal, they are moving in the same direction with the soybean 
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import price.  The estimated cross price elasticities of the Chinese soybean import price 
from the U.S. with respect to the soyoil or soymeal prices are 0.44 and 0.30 respectively.   
Table 10.  Estimation Results of the Two-country Partial Equilibrium Model 
Equation Variable Coefficient Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -4.2451 3.5773 -1.19 0.2405
US
CHRD  -0.0392*** 0.0141 -2.78 0.0074
Corn
CHP  0.2717*** 0.0914 2.97 0.0044
CHINC  0.2961 0.5201 0.57 0.5714
CHLDI  0.5782 0.8977 0.64 0.5222
Oil
CHP  0.4430*** 0.0743 5.96 <.0001
Meal
CHP  0.3011*** 0.0794 3.79 0.0004
BR
CHIMP  -0.0015 0.0010 -1.48 0.1448
AR
CHIMP  -0.0005 0.0009 -0.52 0.6062
Chinese Inverse 
Residual Demand: 
...) ,( USCH
IMP
US RDPP =  
CHBP  -0.0692 0.0435 -1.59 0.1179
Intercept 10.6230*** 3.9991 2.66 0.0103
CH
USRS  0.1306*** 0.0405 3.23 0.0021
Corn
USP  -0.2770 0.1442 -1.92 0.0600
USINC  -1.1029** 0.5496 -2.01 0.0497
Oil
USP  0.4348*** 0.0734 5.92 <.0001
Meal
USP  0.5027*** 0.1315 3.82 0.0003
EU
USXPT  -0.0067 0.0052 -1.27 0.2082
JP
USXPT  -0.0093 0.0370 -0.25 0.8023
MXXPT  -0.0848*** 0.0265 -3.19 0.0023
U.S. Inverse 
Residual Supply: 
...)  ,( CHUS
XPT
US RSPP =
 
USSTK  -0.0694*** 0.0260 -2.67 0.0100
Intercept -0.5210 0.3634 -1.43 0.1566Price Relationship: 
)P(PP XPTUS
IMP
US =  XPTUSP  1.1145*** 0.0676 16.48 <.0001
Note:  *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.  
 
 89
 For the variable Chinese biotech policy, BPCH, the sign is negative as expected 
indicating that the impacts of Chinese biotech policy on U.S. soybean exports to China is 
negative.  However, the variable BPCH is not significant (10% significance level), 
implying that Chinese biotech policy did not impose significant impacts on U.S. soybean 
exports to China in the long-run.  This result is consistent with the actual observations 
discussed in Chapter three.  
 For U.S. inverse residual soybean supply function (equation 51), seven 
independent variables, including the residual supply quantity, , the U.S. personal 
disposable income, , the U.S. soyoil prices, , the U.S. soymeal prices, , 
the U.S. soybean exports to Japan, , the U.S. soybean exports to Mexico, , 
and the U.S. soybean stocks, , are statistically significant at 1% to 5% significance 
levels respectively as shown in Table 10.  The sign of the parameter for the U.S. soybean 
residual supply for China, , is positive as expected, indicating an upward sloping 
U.S. residual soybean supply for China.  
CH
USRS
USINC
Oil
USP
Meal
USP
JP
USXPT
MX
USXPT
USSTK
CH
USRS
 By equation (56), the estimated coefficient for the U.S. soybean residual supply 
quantity, , is also the price flexibility of the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply 
function for China, which is also the Adjusted Lerner Index, ALI
CH
USRS
CH by equation (25), 
which can be used to measure the market power of Chinese soybean importers.  From 
another perspective, according to the left hand side of equation (25), this estimated 
coefficient also indicates the marketing margin of Chinese soybean importers (the 
difference between the Chinese domestic soybean price and the sum of Chinese soybean 
import price from the U.S. and transaction costs of Chinese soybean importers and import 
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tariffs).  Results from Table 10 imply that the marketing margin of Chinese soybean 
importers is 13% of the soybean import price from the U.S. plus tariffs.  
 Table 11 summarizes the above discussion.  The estimated price flexibility of the 
Chinese inverse residual demand for U.S. soybeans is -0.04, implying that the marketing 
margin for U.S. soybean exporters (the difference between the U.S. soybean export price 
and the sum of the U.S. farm level soybean prices and the transaction costs of U.S. 
soybean exporters) is 4% of the export price.  The estimated price flexibility of the U.S. 
inverse residual soybean supply function for China is 0.13, implying that the marketing 
margin for Chinese soybean importers is 13% of the soybean import price plus tariffs.  
Comparing these two coefficients, it can be inferred that the market power of Chinese 
soybean importers is stronger than that of U.S. soybean exporters.  
Table 11.  Summary of the Estimation Results 
Model Coefficient for Quantity 
Standard 
Error 
T-
Value Pr>|t| 
Chinese Inverse Residual Demand: 
,...)( IMPCH
IMP
US QPP =  
-0.04*** 0.0141 -2.78 0.0074 
U.S. Inverse Residual Supply: 
...)( XPTUS
XPT
US QPP =  
0.13*** 0.0405 3.23 0.0021 
Note:  *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
COMPETITIVE ANAYSIS OF CHINA’S SOYBEAN IMPORT MARKET 
 Results of Chapter seven show that in the Chinese soybean import market Chinese 
soybean importers have stronger market power than U.S. soybean exporters.  In addition, 
it is assumed that Chinese soybean importers also have stronger market power than 
soybean exporters from Brazil and Argentina.  Based on the above results and assumption, 
a competitive analysis of the Chinese soybean import market is conducted by examining 
both annual and monthly data of Chinese soybean imports from these three soybean 
exporting countries.  In addition, after examining the competitive structure of these three 
soybean exporters in the Chinese soybean import market, competitiveness of the U.S., 
Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese soybean import market is compared by analyzing 
their soybean exports costs. 
The U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese Soybean Import Market 
As reviewed in Chapter two, China is the number one soybean importer and the 
U.S., Brazil, and Argentina are the top three soybean exporters in the world.  Figure 25 
shows that soybean surpluses (defined as the difference between the domestic supply and 
the domestic consumption in soybean exporting countries) in the U.S., Brazil, and 
Argentina increased annually in recent years.  In 2005, soybean surpluses in the U.S., 
Brazil, and Argentina reached 33, 25, and 10 million metric tons, respectively (USDA-
FAS, 2006b).  To avoid high accumulation of soybean stockpiles, export markets are 
crucial for the soybean industries in the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.   
 
 92
 
Soybean Surpluses in the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina
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Figure 25.  Soybean Surplus in Main Soybean Exporting Countries 
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D data, 2006b.  
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Figure 26.  Soybean Shortage in Main Soybean Importing Countries 
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D data, 2006b.  
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 Figure 26 shows the trends of soybean shortages (defined as the difference 
between the domestic consumption and the domestic production in the soybean importing 
countries) for the top soybean importers in the world, including China, the European 
Union, Japan, and Mexico.  Soybean shortage in Japan was quite stable in the past, and 
soybean shortage in the EU and Mexico did not increase much in the past decade.  By 
these trends, it can not be expected that the EU, Japan, and Mexico will increase their 
soybean imports much in the future.  However, for China, its soybean shortage increased 
dramatically in recent years, from almost null in 1991 to 27 million metric tons in 2005.  
 Combining the above trends of soybean exporters and soybean importers, it is 
reasonable to state that China is and will continue to be the most important market for the 
U.S., Brazil, and Argentina’s soybean surpluses.  Results from Chapter seven indicate 
that Chinese soybean importers had stronger market power over U.S. soybean importers.  
Three large soybean suppliers facing one large soybean buyer with a rapid growth 
potential may support the assumption that Chinese soybean importers may have stronger 
market power than soybean exporters from Brazil and Argentina.  
 Because China is the most important market for the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, 
these three soybean exporters compete with each other in the Chinese soybean import 
market to expand their soybean market shares.  From a soybean suppliers’ perspective, 
the competitive relationship among the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese 
soybean import market will be examined in the following section.  To simplify the 
problem, Brazil and Argentina are considered as a group, the South America (SA) 
soybean supplier.  As shown in figure 27, the U.S. and South America (Brazil and 
Argentina) are competing in the leading soybean import market, China.  However, the 
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question is “what is the relationship between the U.S. and South America in the Chinese 
soybean import market?”   
 
China U.S. 
Brazil 
Argentina
South America 
Figure 27.  Chinese Soybean Import Market 
* Source: MapQuest, Inc. (Mapquest.com). 
Are the U.S. and South America Substitutive Soybean Suppliers for China? 
Figure 28 shows that Chinese annual soybean imports from South America were 
slightly lower than that from the U.S. before 2001 and in 2004.  From 2001 to 2003 and 
the U.S. Brazil Argentina 
Substitutes or Complements? 
China
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2005, Chinese annual soybean imports from South America surpassed the United States.  
In 2005, China imported 15.35 million metric tons of soybeans from SA with Brazil 7.95 
million metric tons and Argentina 7.4 million metric tons.  In contrast, China imported 11 
million metric tons of soybeans from the United States.  U.S. soybean exports to China 
were higher than the soybean exports from either Brazil or Argentina to China, but lower 
than the sum of Brazil’s and Argentina’s soybean exports to China.   
11.05
15.35
0
4
8
12
16
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
M
ill
io
n 
M
et
ri 
To
ns
   
   
   
   
 
U.S. South America  
 
Figure 28.  Chinese Soybean Imports from the U.S. and South America 
Source:  The Chinese Minister of Agriculture, 2006 
 Since soybeans produced in both the U.S. and South America contain biotech 
varieties, we can assume that soybeans exported to China from the U.S. and SA were 
homogeneous.  If the U.S. chose to set higher export prices, China could reduce their 
imports from the U.S. and increase their imports from South America, provided that 
soybean stocks in the U.S. were enough to satisfy China’s soybean demand, vice versa.  
By examining the soybean export prices from the U.S. and South America, it can be 
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found that the soybean export prices from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina to China were 
similar as shown in figure 29.  Observations indicate that the U.S. and SA chose to set 
their soybean export prices at similar levels, and Chinese soybean importers decided how 
much to buy soybeans from each soybean supplier.  Next step is to investigate the 
soybean stocks in the U.S. and SA to see whether their soybean stocks can satisfy China’s 
soybean demand, which is a necessary condition for the U.S. and SA to be substitute 
suppliers to supply soybeans to China.  
China's Sobyean Import Prices from 
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Figure 29.  Chinese Soybean Import Prices from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina* 
*These export prices are derived CIF prices, divided export value by export quantity.  
Those observations that export quantity was zero were deleted; Pusch is the soybean 
export price from the U.S. to China, Pbrch is the soybean export price from Brazil to 
China, and Parch is the soybean export price from Argentina to China. 
 
 Figure 30 shows China’s soybean imports from the U.S. and soybean stocks in SA.  
If there is a production shock in the U.S. or U.S. soybean exporters raise their soybean 
export prices, soybean stocks in SA are more than enough to satisfy China’s soybean 
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demand.  From this perspective, SA can be a substitute supplier for the U.S. to supply 
soybeans to China.  In contrast, Figure 31 shows China’s soybean imports from SA and 
soybean stocks in the United States.  If there is a production shock in SA or if SA 
soybean exporters raise their soybean export prices, soybean stocks in the U.S. are NOT 
enough to satisfy China’s soybean demand from 2001 to 2004.  Even in 2005, U.S. 
soybean stocks were just able to satisfy China’s demand.  From this perspective, the U.S. 
cannot serve as a complete substitute supplier for SA to supply soybeans to China.  But 
the U.S. could be a partial substitute for SA to supply soybeans to China. 
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Figure 30.  China’s Soybean Imports from the U.S. and Soybean Stocks in SA 
Source:  USDA-FAS, 2006a; the Chinese Minister of Agriculture, 2006. 
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Figure 31.  China’s Soybean Imports from SA and Soybean Stocks in the U.S. 
Source:  USDA-FAS, 2006a; the Chinese Minister of Agriculture, 2006. 
The U.S. and South America Are Seasonal Complementary Soybean Suppliers for 
China  
Since the U.S. is located in the northern hemisphere and South America is located 
in the southern hemisphere, they have opposing growing seasons, i.e., different 
production time periods to supply soybeans to markets.  Similar to China, the harvest 
season for U.S. soybeans is in October and November, and for South America, March and 
April.  Figure 32 plots the U.S. monthly soybean stocks and Figure 33 shows the monthly 
soybean stock levels in Brazil (Argentina data is not available).  Figure 32 indicates that, 
generally, U.S. soybean stocks reach the highest level in November.  Then due to 
consumption and exports, U.S. soybean stocks decrease to their lowest levels in August 
and September, with some years in October.  For Brazil (Figure 33), the soybean stocks 
normally reach their highest level in April.  Then due to consumption and exports, 
Brazilian soybean stocks decline gradually, and reach their lowest levels in January and 
February.   
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Figure 32.  U.S. Soybean Stocks  
Source: USDA-ERS, 2005b; 2005c. 
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Figure 33.  Brazilian Soybean Stocks  
Source: USDA-FAS, Attache Report (1998-2005). 
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 Because of the difference in soybean growing seasons for the U.S. and South 
America, their soybean export behaviors are different.  Figure 34 depicts the U.S. and 
South America’s average monthly soybean exports to China from 1999 to 2004.  Figure 
34 clearly shows that soybean trade in the Chinese import market can be divided into two 
periods.  The first period is the South American period (period I), which includes June, 
July, August, September, and October.  In period I, SA exports just harvested soybeans to 
China, without or with less storage costs, and the U.S. exports stocked soybeans to China 
with additional storage costs.  South America has the seasonal advantage and results in a 
dominant position in the Chinese soybean import market and the U.S. is in a 
disadvantageous position because of the additional storage costs. 
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Figure 34.  Average Monthly Soybean Exports from the U.S. and South America 
(Brazil and Argentina) to China (1999-2004) 
Source: the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, 2006. 
 
 101
 The second period is the U.S. period (period II), which includes November, 
December, January, February, March, April, and May.  In this period, the U.S. has just 
harvested their soybeans and becomes the main soybean supplier for China, and South 
America supplies only a small amount of soybeans for China from their soybean stocks 
during period II.  In period II the U.S. exports just harvested soybeans to China without 
or with little storage costs and SA exports stocked soybeans with additional storage costs.  
Therefore, the U.S. has the seasonal advantage in this period, resulting in a dominant 
position in the Chinese soybean import market and SA is in a disadvantageous position 
due to the additional storage costs. The above analysis implies that South America and 
the U.S. are seasonal complementary soybean suppliers for China, with South America 
dominating period I and the U.S. dominating period II.   
 From the importers’ side, Chinese soybean importers may have stronger market 
power relative to soybean exporters from both the U.S. and SA, and they will exercise 
their monopsony power to maximize their soybean import profits.  Strategically, to 
reduce the risk of price increases, Chinese soybean importers will not rely on only one 
soybean supplying country.  Chinese soybean importers will work with different soybean 
supplying countries to diversify their supply risk.  Taking this seasonal factor into 
consideration, we hypothesize that Chinese soybean importers will import soybeans from 
SA in period I, and from the U.S. in period II.  In that case, because of the market power 
of Chinese soybean importers and this seasonal difference, the U.S. and SA actually 
become seasonal complementary soybean suppliers for China, with SA dominating 
period I and the U.S. dominating period II. 
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Competitiveness Comparison among the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese 
Soybean Import Market 
 Competitiveness of soybean industries of the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the 
Chinese soybean import market can be evaluated by comparing their export costs.  
Schnepf, et al. (2001) compared soybean export costs of the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.  
Schnepf, et al. divided export costs into three categories, including production costs, 
internal marketing and transportation costs, and international transportation costs.  
Production costs were further separated into variable costs and fixed costs.  They used 
1998/99 data and compared export costs of the heartland region from the U.S., the State 
of Parana and Moto Grosso from Brazil, and the northern Buenos Aires/southern Santa 
Fe area from Argentina.  Table 12 shows the difference of export costs for the U.S., 
Brazil, and Argentina.  
 From Table 12, we can draw the following conclusions 
 1.  The soybean production costs in Brazil were the lowest among the three 
countries, and soybean production costs in the U.S. were the highest with Argentina lying 
between them and close to Brazil; 
 2.  The internal transport and marketing costs in the U.S. were the lowest among 
the three countries, and the internal transport and marketing costs in the Brazil were the 
highest with Argentina lying between them and close to Brazil; 
 3.  The freight costs from the U.S. to China were the lower relative to the freight 
costs from Brazil and Argentina to China; 
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Table 12.  Soybean Export Costs of the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina 
U.S. Brazil Argentina 
Cost Item* 
Heartland Parana Mato Grosso Buenos Aires/Santa Fe 
  $/bu. $/bu. 
% of 
U.S. 
Costs 
$/bu. 
% of  
U.S. 
Costs 
$/bu. 
% of 
U.S. 
Costs 
Variable Costs 1.71 2.78 -- 3.17  1.9 -- 
Fixed Costs 3.4 1.38 -- 0.72  2.02 -- 
Total 
Production 
Costs 
5.11 4.16 81% 3.89 76% 3.92 77% 
 
Internal 
Transport & 
Marketing Costs 
0.43 0.85 -- 1.34 -- 0.81 -- 
Cost at Border 5.54 5.01 90% 5.23 94% 4.73 85% 
 
Freight Costs to 
China** 0.75 0.81 -- 0.81 -- 0.81 -- 
Export Tax*** -- -- -- -- -- 1.11 -- 
Cost at Main 
China Ports 6.29 5.82 93% 6.04 96% 6.65 106% 
*  Data for production costs and internal transport and marketing costs are 1989/99 data 
from Schnepf, et al. (2001).  
**  The freight costs to China are 2005 data from USDA-AMS, “Grain Transportation 
Reports”, February 2005.  
***  Argentina imposed a 23.5% export tax and surcharge on soybean exports from 2001. 
(See Chapter three—Soybean Policies in Argentina).  
 
 4.  Export taxes and surcharges increased the soybean export costs for Argentina; 
 5.  In aggregate, the total soybean export costs for Brazil were the lowest and the 
export costs for Argentina were the highest with the U.S. lying between them.  However, 
if the Argentinean government eliminates export taxes on soybeans, then the total 
soybean export costs for Argentina will be $5.54/bushel and becomes the lowest.  
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Therefore, Argentina still has a great potential to become the most competitive soybean 
supplier in the Chinese soybean import market.  
Summary 
 Based on the empirical results from Chapter seven, this chapter examined the 
competitive structure of the Chinese soybean import market.  As the number one soybean 
importer in the world, Chinese soybean importers have stronger market power over 
soybean exporters from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.  The top three soybean suppliers 
for China—the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina—compete with each other in the Chinese 
soybean import market.   
 From China’s side, Chinese soybean importers can exercise their monopsony 
power to maximize their import profits.  Strategically, Chinese soybean importers will not 
rely on a single soybean supplier.  To reduce the risk of a price increase, Chinese soybean 
importers will establish good relationships with different soybean supplying countries to 
diversify their supply risk.  Taking the seasonal factor into consideration, Chinese 
soybean importers import most of their soybeans from South America in period I, and the 
U.S. in period II.  Due to Chinese soybean importers strategic choice and the seasonal 
difference, the U.S. and South America (Brazil and Argentina) actually become seasonal 
complementary soybean suppliers for China, with South America dominating period I 
and the U.S. dominating period II.   
 However, from their export costs’ perspective, currently, Brazilian soybean export 
costs were the lowest and Argentinean soybean export costs were the highest with the 
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U.S. in the middle.  However, if the Argentinean government can eliminate export taxes 
on soybeans, the soybean export costs in Argentina could be the lowest. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summary and Conclusions 
 China, as the number one soybean importer with 1.3 billion people and rapid 
economic growth, becomes a potential enormous market for soybeans.  Compared to 
other main soybean importers in the world, China attracts more attention from the U.S., 
Brazil, and Argentina, the leading global soybean suppliers.  The U.S. leads the world in 
soybean production, consumption, and exports.  U.S. soybean policy, including 
government loan programs and direct and counter-cyclical government payment 
programs, played a very important role in supporting the U.S. soybean industry and 
keeping the U.S.’ leading position in the world.  In the last decade, because of economic 
reform in the South America (Brazil and Argentina), soybean industries in Brazil and 
Argentina developed rapidly.  South America became the main soybean supplier and a 
strong competitor for the U.S. in the world soybean market.  
 With the continuous increase in excess soybean supplies in the U.S., Brazil, and 
Argentina, China becomes the primary market for their soybean surplus.  As a result, 
these three soybean exporters—the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina—are competing in the 
Chinese soybean import market.  Given the above facts, we can hypothesize that the 
Chinese soybean market can be characterized either by monopsony, whereby Chinese 
soybean importers have stronger market power relative to soybean exporters in the U.S, 
Brazil, and Argentina; or oligopoly, whereby soybean exporters from the U.S., Brazil, and 
Argentina have relatively stronger market power.  This research, based on the inverse 
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residual demand and inverse residual supply model, developed a two-country partial 
equilibrium trade model to test who has stronger market power in the Chinese soybean 
import market.   
 Past research to test market power used either the inverse residual demand model 
or the inverse residual supply model (Carter, et al., 1999; Goldberg and Knetter, 1999; 
Poosiripinyo and Reed, 2005), which were defined as unrestricted models, because they 
did not include an equilibrium condition.  Without an equilibrium condition, estimation 
results from the unrestricted model may not be reliable.  This research developed a 
restricted model, a two-country partial equilibrium trade model combining the inverse 
residual demand and the inverse residual supply model together and incorporated the 
equilibrium condition in the model as a system, to test market power of the Chinese 
soybean import market.   
 Because data for Brazil and Argentina were difficult to obtain, this research 
applied the two-country partial equilibrium model to U.S.-China soybean trade.  By 
comparing the results from the restricted model and unrestricted model, this research 
found that results from the restricted model were more reasonable and consistent with 
actual observations.  The estimated price flexibilities or the Adjusted Lerner Indexes from 
the restricted model also suggest that Chinese soybean importers have stronger market 
power relative to U.S. soybean exporters.  The marketing margin for U.S. soybean 
exporters (the difference between the U.S. soybean export price and the sum of the U.S. 
farm level soybean prices and the transaction costs of U.S. soybean exporters) was 
estimated at 4% of the export price.  In contrast, the marketing margin for Chinese 
soybean importers (the difference between China domestic soybean price (in U.S. dollars) 
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and the sum of soybean import price from the U.S. and import tariffs plus the transaction 
costs of China’s soybean imports from the U.S.) is 13% of the soybean import price plus 
tariff.   
 In regards to Chinese biotech policies, the estimated result from the restricted 
model implies that Chinese biotech policies have not imposed significant impacts on U.S. 
soybean exports to China. 
 On the basis of these empirical results, this research further analyzed the 
competitive structure of the Chinese soybean import market.  By examining monthly data, 
South America and the U.S. look like seasonal complementary soybean suppliers to 
China, with South America dominating period I (June, July, August, September, and 
October) and the U.S. dominating period II (November, December, January, February, 
March, April, and May).  Possible explanation is that Chinese soybean importers exercise 
their monopsony power and choose to diversify their soybean suppliers, reducing price 
risk of depending on only one soybean supplier.  Chinese soybean importers’ strategic 
choice and the seasonal difference make the U.S. and South America seasonal 
complementary soybean suppliers for China.  
 Comparing soybean export costs of the three countries, Brazil has the most 
advantage in soybean production costs, followed by Argentina and the U.S.; the U.S. has 
the most advantage in its internal transport and marketing costs, followed by Argentina 
and Brazil; and the U.S. also has the advantage in its international transportation costs 
compared to Brazil and Argentina.  One disadvantage for the Argentinean soybean 
industry is its export tax and surcharges imposed by their government, which reduces its 
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competitiveness in the international market.  In aggregate, the total soybean export costs 
for Brazil were the lowest and the export costs for Argentina were the highest with the 
U.S. lying between them.  However, if the Argentinean government eliminates its export 
taxes on soybeans, then the total soybean export costs for Argentina will be the lowest.  
Therefore, Argentina still has great potential to become the most competitive soybean 
supplier for China.   
Policy Implications 
 In terms of policy implications for the U.S. soybean industry, facing strong 
competition from South America, it is difficult to keep the U.S. in its lead position in the 
world.  In addition, we cannot expect that U.S. market share in the Chinese soybean 
import market can be further expanded.  If U.S. soybean production continues to grow, 
other sources of soybean consumption, like industrial usage for fuel transformation, will 
be required for maintaining stable farm incomes for U.S. soybean farmers.  The U.S. 
soybean export advantage is its relatively low marketing and transportation costs both 
domestically and internationally.  With the development of infrastructure in Brazil and 
Argentina, this U.S. advantage will become less and less.  Therefore, if the U.S. soybean 
industry wants to keep their current position in the Chinese soybean import market, some 
governmental policy supports may be necessary. 
Future Research 
 When data for Brazil and Argentina are available, the two-country partial 
equilibrium models for Brazil-China and Argentina-China can be empirically tested.  To 
precisely examine the competitiveness of the soybean industries of the U.S., Brazil, and 
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Argentina in the Chinese soybean import market, costs models, which can reflect storage 
costs and production costs as well as other transportation costs, can be developed and 
applied.  In addition, the two-country partial equilibrium trade model also can be adjusted 
and applied to other bulk commodity trade in the international market.  
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